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ABSTRACT 
American Democracy has broken down. This crisis was on dramatic display in the 2016 
Presidential Campaign. Americans are resentful, distrustful and pessimistic. We find it easy to 
blame “the other side” for the deadlock, mendacity and irresponsibility in American public 
life. By virtue of their public role, American law schools have an obligation to address the 
breakdown in order to understand and try to ameliorate it. That task is currently unfulfilled by 
law schools individually and collectively. They are distracted by marketing and pedagogy. 
Religious law schools, which retain the traits of normative discourse, mission, Truth and tragic 
limit to a greater extent than do secular schools, could assume responsibility for the health of 
American democracy. These schools could begin consideration of the spiritual sources of the 
nihilism in this culture. There are legitimate theological objections to playing this public role 
in a rapidly secularizing society. But if these objections are overcome, not only might 
American Democracy be renewed, so might religion itself. 
AUTHOR NOTE 
Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law. Professor Ledewitz is the author of 
three books: Church, State, and the Crisis in American Secularism; Hallowed Secularism; 
and American Religious Democracy. This paper was prepared with support from the Duquesne 
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A number of my colleagues have responded to this article—that is the kind of community we 
have at Duquesne—but I wish to especially thank Jane Moriarty for her careful reading and 
suggestions. I have been writing law review articles for many years. I have rarely encountered 
the serious engagement with ideas that I have experienced with the UMass Law Review. My 
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I think the dominant theme. . .is what I’m always going 
to think of as the Duquesne Critique, which is that I 
subsume the language of morality into the language of 
law. The critique is that I’m reluctant to use, and Bruce 
[Ledewitz] even said fearful and insecure with, the 
language of morality. 
I don’t think it’s an accident that this critique is raised 
in a Catholic law school, and I think one of the reasons 
that . . . people are quicker to raise it here than they are 
elsewhere, is that the moral and religious conversation 
that can be had by many people here is a much richer 
one than many other Americans can have, privately, in 
terms of moral and religious terms. That is, secular 
Americans can’t have the religious conversation at all. 
The moral discourse, the tools of analysis, the rhetoric 
that is available for moral discussion, it seems to me, 
for a lot of people, is much more impoverished than the 
rhetoric that’s available for any discussions in terms of 




n 1999, then-Stanford Law Professor William Simon participated in 
a discussion of his book about legal ethics—The Practice of 
Justice
2
—at Duquesne University School of Law. In the program, 
Duquesne law professors and others discussed the book and Professor 
Simon responded to these comments. It was during his response that 
Professor Simon said that he detected a pattern in these comments—he 
called it the Duquesne Critique. The critique was that Professor Simon 
had substituted law for morality in deriving values upon which a 
normative foundation for legal ethics could be built. Simon admitted, 
in effect, that he had substituted law for morality, and had done so 
because, in a secular context, no satisfactory discussion of morals 
                                                 
1
 William H. Simon et al., The First Annual Thomas W. Henderson Lecture in Legal 
Ethics at Duquesne University School of Law Presents William H. Simon: 
Thinking Like A Lawyer-About Ethics, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 1015, 1048-49 (2000). 
2
 WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 
(1998). 
I 
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could take place. At a “Catholic law school” like Duquesne, a 
conversation based on morality and religion “can be had.”
3
 For “a lot 
of” Americans, in contrast, moral conversation is “impoverished” 




Professor Simon describes a religious law school as a special 
place. While American society generally had lost its normative 
capacity, a religious law school had not. All that secular America can 
have is a neutral law of public values. Professor Simon is here 
reminiscent of the public reason of John Rawls.
5
 In contrast, a 
religious law school retains the capacity for full normative 
engagement. 
It did not occur to Professor Simon that this precious normative 
resource—”America’s religious law schools”
6
—might be used to 
renew American public life. Simon accepted the normative division he 
described, perhaps as the price of secular life. But now that American 
public life is in terrible disrepair, that complacency is no longer 
adequate. 
The public emergency today is not a confined matter, like the 
grounding of legal ethics that was at issue in 1999 in my vignette 
above. Today, the emergency is the breakdown of American 
Democracy itself. Although, as I will assert later in this article, this 
breakdown is related to the collapse of shared moral values that 
Professor Simon described, it is not necessary to my argument that this 
conclusion be accepted. My main point here is that America’s 
religious law schools offer the kind of rich space to confront this 
public emergency that Professor Simon noted in his more limited 
context. By speaking of what religious law schools can do, I do not 
mean that such law schools have an institutional voice or message as 
such. I mean that there is an investigation that such law schools can 
initiate and support, which cannot readily take place elsewhere. 
Therefore, although all law schools have an obligation to come to the 
                                                 
3





 See Katz, infra note 148 and the accompanying text (explaining public reason). 
6
 This is my term instead of religiously-affiliated law school. I wish to include 
schools founded by religious institutions or persons and still influenced by that 
tradition, whether actually continuing to be affiliated institutionally. 
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aid of American Democracy, religious law schools have the greatest 
capacity today to do so. 
To establish this, the first Part of this article sketches broadly the 
breakdown of American Democracy. This part of the article is 
impressionistic, mostly because this is not a matter many would 
contest. Other than breakdown, how can one account for a Presidential 
election in which substantial numbers of primary voters supported two 
establishment outsiders—Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders—who 
argued that America is going in the wrong direction and that, in crucial 
ways, the game is rigged against ordinary people by powerful, 
shadowy forces? 
But the crisis in American public life is only part of the framework 
I set forth. In Part II of the article, I argue that America’s law schools, 
and by extension, the legal academy, are failing to acknowledge, let 
alone carry out, our special responsibility for the maintenance and 
defense of constitutional democracy. We are not even confronting the 
crisis. 
The third Part of the article echoes Professor Simon’s appreciation 
of the unique character of America’s religious law schools. They are 
still a place where a broader and richer engagement with public life 
can go forward. Only what can be considered religious traits can 
address the crisis in American public life. But the purpose of this 
richer engagement, pace Professor Simon, is not simply to enrich the 
lives of religious believers at these law schools. The purpose must be 
to renew and transform American society. 
The third part of the article also addresses the context that 
Professor Simon presupposed—the collapse of shared morality in 
secular society. This is indeed an important aspect of the breakdown of 
American Democracy, which has become a spiritual crisis. That is 
another reason that religious law schools have a special role to play in 
addressing the crisis. 
But, are there not good reasons, even theological ones, why this 
project of democratic renewal should not go forward at religious law 
schools? Part IV of the article considers the threat to their mission that 
such a democratic role might entail. I conclude that this democratic 
role would not undermine the mission of religious law schools. Indeed, 
this democratic role for religious law schools might actually enhance 
their mission, by leading to the renewal of religious faith and its 
secular equivalent. 
We live in a time of momentous challenge. We have all been guilty 
of complacency in the face of that challenge—of assuming that our 
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governmental institutions are eternal, rather than in deadly peril. It is 
the same challenge that Abraham Lincoln faced—whether 
“government of the people, by the people, for the people, 
shall. . .perish from the earth.”
7
 In the face of that challenge, Lincoln 
taught that we must think and act anew.
8
 This article is an attempt 
to begin to do just that. 
There is no guarantee of democratic renewal. Martin Heidegger 
once said, 
A decisive question for me today is how a political 
system can be assigned to today’s technological age at 
all, and which political system would that be? I have no 




I. THE BREAKDOWN OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 




Really, the question is not so much whether there is a breakdown 
of American Democracy, as it is where to start in describing it. A large 
majority of the American people state in polls that they disagree with 
the direction in which the country is going;
11
 they do not trust their 
                                                 
7
 Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863) (transcript available at 
http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/gettysburg.htm 
[https://perma.cc/778A-AFP2]). Of course, in the Gettysburg Address, Lincoln 
was calling on the American people to resolve the question affirmatively. 
8
 “The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is 
piled high with difficulty, and we must rise—with the occasion. As our case is 
new, so we must think anew, and act anew.” Abraham Lincoln Annual Message to 




 Interview by Der Spiegel with Martin Heidegger (1966) (transcript available at 
http://web.ics.purdue.edu/ ~other1/Heidegger%20Der%20Spiegel.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AVV7-4R5S]). Heidegger insisted that the interview not be 
published during his lifetime; it appeared in the magazine on May 31, 1976, five 
days after Heidegger’s death. 
10




 The Rasmussen Report from July 3, 5-7, 2016 states that 26% of Americans feel 
that the country is going in the right direction, whereas 68% feel the country is 
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leaders or major institutions and they are dissatisfied with their major 
political party choices in the most recent presidential campaign: 
Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton.
12
 At the beginning of the 2016 
Presidential election campaign, for many Americans, the major party 
choices were between a racist buffoon, utterly without qualifications or 
temperament to be President and an ambitious, dishonest and corrupt 
career politician, utterly without meaningful accomplishment, who 
would be in jail for compromising U.S. classified material if she had 
been an ordinary citizen and the FBI had conducted an honest 
investigation.
13
 President Barack Obama looks pretty good at this 
moment,
14
 but only in contrast. And then there was a week in July 
2016, in which two African Americans were shot to death by police 
and five police officers were gunned down by a sniper.
15
 America is in 
a very dark place. 
It is not obvious, however, what the underlying source is of 
America’s deep political dissatisfaction. The political left attributes it 
to inequality and economic stagnation. Noam Chomsky, for example, 
speaks of the “breakdown” in the following terms: 
                                                                                                                   
going in the wrong direction. Right Direction or Wrong Track, RASMUSSEN 
REPORTS (July 7, 2016) 
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/mood_of 
_america/right_direction_or_wrong_track [https://perma.cc/X54X-ZZAB] (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2017). 
12
 An article in the New York Times stated on July 9, 2016 on the front page: “Never 
have two presidential nominees been as unpopular as Mr. Trump and Mrs. Clinton, 
and they are not fully trusted by their own sides nor showing significant crossover 
appeal in polls.” Patrick Healy, Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton Struggle to Be 








 Mid-July approval rating for President Obama is 51%, versus a Presidential 
average from 1938 to the present of 53% in a comparative point in the Presidency. 
Presidential Approval Ratings, GALLUP, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/116479/barack-obama-presidential-job-approval.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/ARB5-W9GM] (last visited Feb. 14, 2017). 
15
 Faith Karimi, Catherine E. Shoichet & Ralph Ellis, Dallas Sniper Attack: 5 
Officers Killed, Suspect Identified, CNN (July 9, 2016), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/08/us/philando-castile-alton-sterling-protests/ 
[https://perma.cc/3GUS-S2HL]; Two Police Shootings, Two Videos, Two Black 
Men Dead, CNN (July 7, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/07/us/shootings-
alton-sterling-philando-castile/ [https://perma.cc/W2BX-ET68]. 
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The state-corporate programs of the past 35 or so years 
have had devastating effects on the majority of the 
population, with stagnation, decline and sharply 
enhanced inequality being the most direct outcomes. 
This has created fear and has left people feeling 
isolated, helpless, victims of powerful forces they can 
neither understand or influence.
16
  
The description of the breakdown of American Democracy on the 
political right, and the prescription for its treatment, is more mixed, 
with some references to the moral direction of the country.
17
 But, 
largely, the diagnosis of the right is similar to that of the left: economic 
stagnation is the problem. The difference is that for the right, the 
prescription is faster economic growth to be accomplished through 
deregulation and tax cuts.
18
  
Whatever the source, the intensity of the popular dissatisfaction is 
striking. American politics today is characterized by anger and 
resentment. On the right, this is described as the phenomenon of the 
angry white voter.
19
 This account suggests that the white majority is 
                                                 
16
 C.J. Polychroniou, Noam Chomsky on the Breakdown of American Society and a 




 The ambivalence on the political right is illustrated in the reaction to J.D. Vance’s 
book, Hillbilly Elegy: A Memoir of a Family and Culture in Crisis (2016), about 
the travail of the white working class. Alexandra Wolfe summed up the book’s 
message in the Wall Street Journal as follows: “[Vance] hopes that his experiences 
and path upward with the help of religion, discipline and family will inspire 
communities to promote those values.” Akexabdra Wolfe, J.D. Vance and the 




 See Stephen Moore, The Late, Great Democratic Party, WASH. TIMES (July 24, 
2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jul/24/economic-growth-has-
stagnated-under-obama/ [https://perma.cc/Z3KM-M9BS]. Moore is identified as a 
senior economic adviser to the Donald Trump campaign. 
19
 Sometimes termed the “angry white male,” as in Thomas L. Friedman’s op-ed in 
the New York Times on July 13, 2016 referring to part of the current GOP base: 
“angry white males who fear they are becoming a minority in their own country 
and hate trade. . . .” Thomas L. Friedman, The (GOP) Party’s Over, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/opinion/the-gop-partys-
over.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/W8HV-LHRM]. 
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being rapidly eclipsed, demographically, politically and culturally, and 
that the former, prevalent, white privilege is under siege.
20
  
On the left, there is also anger and resentment—toward the 
perceived influence of the wealthy and powerful.
21
 Both sides, 
actually nearly everyone in political life, rejects the establishment, 




The fruit of this deep dissatisfaction is a high degree of political 
polarization and scapegoating, which is only likely to worsen since 
revolutionary change is neither happening nor is especially likely to 
happen. Who believes that this most recent Presidential campaign will 
deliver radical change? Without real change, the anger that is already 
present in American politics will just fester, robbing the system of 
perhaps its most valuable resources, political willpower and an 
opportunity for reform. 
The excessive degree of partisanship today is the dominant 
attribute of American Democracy. Not only do the two Parties not 
work together toward compromise in Washington, individual voters 
are not open to persuasion. Michael Tomasky estimates that, in a 
                                                 
20
 See description by my colleague Joseph Sabino Mistick of Trump on July 10, 2016 
in a column in the Pittsburgh Tribune Review: “Unmerited hostility towards the 
weak, poor and those who are different in any way easily generates resentment and 
is sure to garner the support of those who believe that their place in America has 
been unfairly diminished. But it is dangerous talk.” Joseph Mistick, Donald 




 Caroline Bankoff, Leonardo DiCaprio, a Dinosaur, and Thousands of Others at 
the People’s Climate March, N.Y. MAG. (Sept. 21, 2014), 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/09/thousands-participate-in-nyc-
climate-march.html [https://perma.cc/5U36-5Q7X] (indicating that famously 
liberal Hollywood personalities along with 310,000 others marched for climate 
change but, even more broadly, for various levels of systemic change); Lisa W. 
Foderaro, Taking a Call for Climate Change to the Streets, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/nyregion/new-york-city-climate-
change-march.html?_r=1# [https://perma.cc/TBL6-4BN4] (discussing the Climate 
March as a massively attended event organized by a wide coalition of traditionally 
left groups including dozens of environmental, labor and social justice groups). 
22
 Even in endorsing Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders cited the “political revolution” 
he and his supporters have created in the Sanders campaign. Bernie Sanders, 
Forever Forward, READER SUPPORTED NEWS (July 12, 2016), 
http://readersupportednews.org/opinion2/277-75/37964-focus-forever-forward 
[https://perma.cc/M8WS-9ND7]. 
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national election today, “[v]irtually any reasonably qualified Democrat 
would get 45 percent of the vote, as would any reasonably qualified 
Republican. . . .”
23
  
By itself, this kind of polarization could reflect reasonable 
democratic decision-making. If a voter judges global warming to be a 
threat to humanity, for example, that person must vote for the 
Democratic Party Presidential candidate. Not only are the two major 
Party candidates likely to differ on the issue, but the coalitions that 
make up the Parties have vastly different commitments and viewpoints 
concerning climate change.
24
 The same thing would be true, in the 
opposite direction, on issues like abortion and gun rights.
25
  
But the polarization goes deeper than such rational calculations. 
Americans now differ not just on what it is best to do, but on the 
“facts” themselves. So, global warming is not happening. Or the fetus 
is not an independent human being. Or the facts are simply left open—
did NAFTA cost American jobs or not? Both sides just keep repeating 
their versions of reality.
26
 This lack of political discipline—the 
discipline of the facts—inhibits serious debate. Disagreements on the 
facts happens because, increasingly, Americans receive their news 
from like-minded sources.
27
 There is no longer any widely trusted 
source in American public life, à la Walter Cronkite of a previous era. 
                                                 
23




 Jonathan D. Salant, 10 Huge Differences Between Democratic and Republican 
Platforms, N. J. ON-LINE (July 28, 2016, 10:20 am), 
http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/07/dnc_2016_10_big_ways_the_democ
ratic_ platform_diffe.html [https://perma.cc/53JE-GGD9]. 
25
 Will Drabold, Read What the Democratic Platform Says About Guns, Abortion, 
and Immigration, TIME (July 25, 2016), http://time.com/4422862/democratic-
platform-guns-abortion-immigration/ [https://perma.cc/426W-JW8R]. 
26
 To see the intractability of the dispute over NAFTA and jobs, see the conclusion 
that both critics and defenders lack the ability to sustain their claims at John 
Gallagher, Donald Trump Fact-check: NAFTA’s Impact on Automotive Jobs, 




 In 2014, the Pew Research Center reported that “[w]hen it comes to getting news 
about politics and government, liberals and conservatives inhabit different worlds. 
There is little overlap in the news sources they turn to and trust.” Amy Mitchell, 
Jeffrey Gottfried, Jocelyn Kiley, & Katerina Eva Matsa, Political Polarization & 
Media Habits, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Oct. 21, 2014), 
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Republicans and Democrats do not trust each other even to try to 
do the right thing. In other words, Americans do not just disagree 
about policies and facts, they disagree about motives. They do not 
attribute good faith to their political opponents. For example, 
Democrats believe the Republican Party to be populated by the 
wealthy to a vastly greater degree than is the case.
28
 Because of this 
mutual distrust, the potential for cooperation to solve America’s 
problems is remote. 
Of course, partisanship has been a part of American politics since 
America disappointed the hopes of the framers and turned to political 
parties as the organizational structure of democracy.
29
 But even 
the high level of partisanship during the Bill Clinton presidency—
Clinton’s first budget received not a single Republican vote
30
—did not 
prevent the country from impressively closing ranks after the attacks 
of 9/11. Today, even that expression of national unity is resented, as 
the prelude to the discredited invasion of Iraq. 
Along with this polarization, there is scapegoating. For Donald 
Trump, America’s problems can be traced to a phantasm of foreigners: 
Muslims, Mexicans and trade partners. For Bernie Sanders, America’s 




 In the May 2016 issue, Harper’s reported as follows in the Harper’s Index: 
“Percentage of Republicans who earn more than $250,000 a year: 2; Whom 
Democrats estimate earn more than $250,000 a year: 44.” Harper’s Index, 
HARPER’S MAG. (May 2016), http://harpers.org/archive/2016/05/harpers-index-
382/ [https://perma.cc/T5QW-VEN4]. 
29
 “The Framers abhorred the ‘idea of political parties, representing institutionalized 
divisions of interest.’” Mitchell W. Berger & Gregory A. Haile, The Constitutional 
Implications of Government Funding for Florida’s Primary Voting Process: Is It 
Constitutionally Permissible to Publicly Fund the Two Major Parties’ Primaries 
to the Exclusion of All Other Political Parties?, 33 NOVA L. REV. 1, 11 (2008) 
(quoting Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not 
Powers, 119 HARV. L.REV. 2311, 2320 (2006)). 
30
 David Fontana, The Current Generation of Constitutional Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 1061, 
1088 (2005) (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, THE CURRENT GENERATION OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003)). 
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problems can be traced to the rich,
31
 whose contributions to American 
life he essentially ignores.
32
  
Neither political party is capable of producing a nuanced analysis 
of our national problems. Neither party is capable of proposing 
policies that incorporate the best thinking of the other side and which, 
thus, could serve as a blueprint for dealing productively with those 
problems. Scapegoating, always partial, inaccurate and inadequate, 
inevitably leads to political deadlock because it does not deal 
productively with the issues. The resulting deadlock then inflames 
political resentments and reinforces political stereotypes. 
America’s political deadlock has produced a new and dangerous 
anti-democratic and anti-political spirit. On the left, there is a 
widespread view that legislative action that deals seriously with the 
nation’s problems is impossible due to the power of the wealthy. 
Therefore, extra-political action is needed. This conclusion is 
expressly embraced in the public trust litigation movement dealing 
with climate change.
33
 Some environmentalists now seriously propose 
to turn climate policy, which is essentially oversight of the entire 
economy, over to judges.
34
 The thought that grounds the First 
Amendment’s endorsement of free speech—that truth will emerge 
from free debate and will ground public action—is no longer an article 
                                                 
31
 Bernie Sanders, We Need a Serious Talk, CNN (Jan. 9, 2017, 4:19 pm), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/09/opinion s/serious-questions-bernie-sanders-
opinion/ [https://perma.cc/3GCC-BFEQ] (“How do we stop the movement toward 
oligarchy in our country in which the economic and political life of the United 
States is increasingly controlled by a handful of billionaires?”). 
32
 But there is also a phantasm of foreigners on the left. The strikingly unanimous 
rejection of trade deals in both parties is worryingly isolationist and a repudiation 
of American self-confidence and benevolence. (“[T]he Trans-Pacific 
Partnership. . . will be buried with few in either party to mourn it.”). Jackie 
Calmes, What Is Lost by Burying the Trans-Pacific Partnership?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016 /11/12/business/economy/donald-
trump-trade-tpp-trans-pacific-partnership.html [https://perma.cc/7MJH-KAYK]. 
33
 One such American case and its justification “when the political branches abdicate 
their responsibility” is described in Mark Belleville and Katherine Kennedy, Cool 
Lawsuits - Is Climate Change Litigation Dead After Kivalina v. Exxonmobil?, 7 
APPALACHIAN NAT. RES. L.J. 51, 82 (2013). 
34
 Mary Christina Woods & Charles W. Woodward, Atmospheric Trust Litigation 
and the Constitutional Right to a Healthy Climate System: Judicial Recognition At 
Last, 6 WASH. J. ENVT. L. & POL’Y 633, 659 (2016). 
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of faith, on the left. Now, even in theory, such free debate and 
resulting transformative action just cannot happen.
35
 
It is too soon to tell whether the Presidential campaign of Bernie 
Sanders might spark the beginning of a reembrace of politics by the 
left. It is just as likely that the ultimate nomination of Hillary Clinton 
will be seen as justifying the conclusion that politics cannot work. In 
addition, Bernie Sanders describes himself as a kind of antipolitical 
figure, who speaks of revolution rather than politics.
36
 Thus, his 
relative success might not lead a new generation back into normal 
politics. Sanders’ statement in late June that he will “probably vote” 




On the right, the anti-democratic spirit manifests in the denigration 
of politics and government. Shutting down the government, 
repudiating the national debt, “starving the beast,” threatening federal 
law enforcement in seizures of public land are all part of a 
renunciation of political community. The right glorifies only the 
individual. 
                                                 
35
 Although this is not the forum in which to analyze this critique of politics by the 
left, I have to mention my rejection of it in the past. See Bruce Ledewitz, The 
Threat of Independent Political Spending to Democratic Life—and a Plan to Stop 
it, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 133 (2016). Notwithstanding the influence of money in 
general in a capitalist economy, it is simply not the case that particular political 
outcomes in America are determined solely by money interests, or even largely by 
the power of money. The left uses the excuse of money to justify its political 
failures. The broad decline of Democratic Party representation at the state level, in 
state legislatures and governorships, during the era of the Obama presidency is a 
political failure and not a financial one. See also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Michael D. 
Shear & Alan Blinder, In Obama Era, G.O.P. Bolsters Grip in the States, N.Y. 




 See Sanders, supra note 22. On July 26, 2016, Sanders announced the formation of 
an ongoing organization to be called Our Revolution. (Announcement in Reader 
Supported News on file with author). 
37
 David Wright & Tal Kopan, Bernie Sanders: I’ll Probably Vote for Clinton, CNN 
POLITICS (June 24, 2016) http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/24/politics/bernie-sanders-
will-vote-for-hillary-clinton/ [https://perma.cc/JS8Y-XLAY] (“I’ll probably vote 
for Clinton.” By the time of the Democratic Party Convention, Sanders was taking 
a different line about how important it was to defeat Donald Trump, but it may 
have been too late to introduce his supporters to the compromises of ordinary 
politics.). 
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Again, Donald Trump’s success also might look like a return to 
politics. But, to even a greater extent than the campaign of Bernie 
Sanders, Trump campaigned as a wildly antipolitical figure. Trump 
made promises that do not reflect reality. For example, on one 
campaign stop in Pittsburgh, Trump promised the revival of the steel 
and coal industries in very general terms.
38
 Those jobs are coming 
back, he said.
39
 But not only is this unlikely, if not impossible, it is 
probable that even Trump’s supporters do not expect any such result.
40
 And this is also true of other Trump promises, such as building 
a border wall that Mexico pays for. 
Political campaigns often feature unrealizable promises. But, in the 
past, idealistic crusades have been built on the foundation of at least 
potentially attainable goals—the end of the gold standard, or the 
abolition of slavery, or even the attainment of socialism. In contrast, 
Trump is running a campaign based on bluster and feeling. Trump’s 
support echoes a strong man theory of politics
41
—not a healthy 
commitment to democratic life. 
Related to the anti-democratic spirit currently coursing through 
American politics is an absence of faith in the future. There is nothing 
currently in our public life that remotely resembles the “morning in 
America” rhetoric of Ronald Reagan, for example.
42
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Of course, it might be considered merely realistic to predict that 
America is going to decline to some extent, since the degree of 
American dominance in the world since WWII was extraordinary. Yet, 
looking at matters more broadly than just the place of America, it 
could also be argued that there is no time in human history that has 
been better for people than this moment.
43
 Poverty is low.
44
 Human health is improving.
45
 There is no reason to fear 
widespread war—the conflicts going on now are local and terrorism is 
more a deadly nuisance for most people than a genuine threat to 
anyone’s way of life.
46
 There is no obvious reason for the pessimism 
that is so pronounced in American politics. That pessimism is an 
aspect of the overall breakdown. The widespread sense among the 
public that nothing in public life is working well and that nothing is 
likely to work well in the future is not justified, but it is still there. 
All in all, our situation is reminiscent of what the rabbis taught 
about the fall of Jerusalem to the Romans. Why did Jerusalem fall? 
Because of unjustified hatred.
47
 Americans are at each other’s throats, 
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not over some issue. We are at each other’s throats and any issue will 
do. 
Concern in America about the health of American Democracy has 
been high for a while, but it reached a kind of peak with the historic 
vote of the British people to leave the European Union (EU) on June 
23, 2016.
48
 That vote, called Brexit, represented all of the conflicting 
trends swirling in democratic politics in the West and showed how 
hard it is to describe accurately what is going on. In other words, the 
times are momentous and, as the headline read in the New York Times 
on the following Sunday, “caustic,”
49
 but people disagree as to what is 
actually happening. 
For example, was Brexit democratic or anti-democratic? On the 
one hand, the vote to leave the EU could easily be described as an 
attempt to return to democratic government. The EU is not really a 
representative structure. A large part of the dissatisfaction with the EU 
in Britain had to do with the complaint about being ruled by a distant, 
unresponsive bureaucracy in Brussels.
50
 Furthermore, the heart of the 
defense of continuing EU membership had nothing much to do with 
defending democracy. The basic Remain argument was economic
51
—
that Britain going alone would suffer materially because part of its 
current prosperity was based on its serving as an English language 
bridge to European markets. That defense could be looked at as a 
Faustian bargain trading away democracy for jobs. So, the vote to 
leave the EU could be seen as democratically healthy—a later form of 
the American Revolution slogan, “No taxation without 
representation.” 
On the other hand, the European Project—the attempt to create a 
peaceful, prosperous and integrated Europe—went considerably 
beyond mere economics.
52
 It was an effort to broaden the idea of self-
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government to include the entire continent. The vote to leave the EU 
was also premised on an anti-immigrant backlash
53
  and an inter-
generational conflict
54
 over the desire to return to an earlier image of 
Britain populated by “us” versus the “them” who arrived, or were 
born, later. This sort of turning inward in a nostalgic longing for a 
mythical past is not genuinely democratic. The revival of the 
independence movement in Scotland after the vote, and the resentment 
of the younger generation toward the result, suggest that the decision 
to leave the EU did not reflect a desire to perfect democracy in Britain. 
On the Sunday after the vote, Tony Blair, the former British Prime 
Minister and an opponent of leaving the EU, tried to make sense of the 
vote in an op-ed column in the New York Times.
55
 Blair had difficulty 
characterizing the vote. He wrote of a spirit of insurgency on both the 
left and the right against centrist politics.
56
 Without an express 
reference, he seemed to be linking the vote in Britain with the most 
recent American Presidential campaign, with Trump and Sanders 
representing the insurgencies on the right and left and Hillary Clinton 
representing the politics of the center. Blair did not call that spirit of 
insurgency anti-democratic. In fact, Blair memorably wrote that “[f]or 
a day, the British people were the government....”
57
 But that kind of 
direct majority rule is not necessarily what democracy is. In America 
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at least, democracy has always been premised on representative 
government. Congress guarantees the States a Republican form of 
government under the Constitution, not a directly democratic one.
58
 
Blair’s suggestion of direct action by the people against the 
entrenched power of special interests, educated experts and 
unresponsive bureaucracies, especially public ones, has a name—
populism—and that term was used by some in the American political 
context in light of the Brexit vote. For example, the June 20, 2016 
New York Times Book Review asked in a bold front cover, Why 
Populism Now?, with increasingly strong colors of conflagration 
toward the bottom of the page.
59
 You could describe the current 
political moment as one of widespread public frustration with elites of 
all kinds and that is probably what was meant by describing the 
moment as a populist one. 
So, lots of people are concerned about the breakdown of American 
Democracy. But, even with all this attention, we are still too 
complacent. The breakdown of American Democracy has not 
necessarily run its course. As bad as things may seem now, the 
unthinkable can also happen. Unless America changes course, how 
many years will it be before an army general decides that the military 




Before leaving this section describing the breakdown of American 
Democracy, I have to acknowledge the criticism that this section is 
misnamed—perhaps there has never been yet an American 
Democracy. There is an important experiment going on now, called 
The Next System Project that suggests that something very new is 
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needed for future political life.
61
 Much of that Project is focused 
on economic life, but part of the message is that economic decision-
making is a part of democracy and not a separate matter. This 
movement could be viewed as a suggestion that American life is not 
democratic enough and that, rather than a breakdown of democracy, 
the current ferment represents genuine democratic stirrings. This 
movement suggests that America, like Britain under the EU, could be 
seen as ruled by various forms of bureaucracies rather than any longer 
an experiment in self-government. This view, whether pro or anti 
capitalism, is an echo of the old criticism that Americans have become 
subjects rather than citizens.
62
Perhaps, then, the answer to our 
breakdown is a more democratic American economic life. 
II. THE PROPER ROLE OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS TODAY 
The section above shows that it is difficult to characterize or 
explain the current, troubled moment. I am going to suggest below that 
the political crisis is spiritual in nature and that the response must 
therefore also be spiritual. But, before making that suggestion, I want 
to make a different point: even if I am wrong about the nature of the 
political crisis, most people agree that something is currently broken in 
American Democracy. Therefore, the first question for American law 
schools must be our role in addressing the crisis. Simply put, do 
America’s law schools have a special responsibility to address the 
breakdown of American Democracy? If so, how well are America’s 
law schools responding? 
I don’t actually expect much disagreement with the abstract and 
idealized vision of American law schools as having an inherently 
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public role.
63
 As de Tocqueville famously wrote in 1835, “Scarcely 
any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, 
sooner or later, into a judicial question.”
64
 The passage of time has 
only reinforced the public nature of law in America. Phil Neal would 
add 130 years later, that the observation, perhaps an exaggeration then, 
“is nearer the truth today than when De Tocqueville wrote.”
65
  Even 
nearer today. 
Indeed, the quote understates the public role of law. De 
Toqueville’s next sentence traced law’s influence beyond court cases 
into the very language of American politics. Because political issues 
end up in court, “all parties are obliged to borrow, in their daily 
controversies, the ideas, and even the language, peculiar to judicial 
proceedings.”
66
 In America, the language of politics is, to a great 
extent, the language of law. And, of course, that public and political 
language is taught in its most concentrated form in law school. 
This public role of law school is cemented in popular 
understanding. The late John E. Murray, Jr., an important figure in 
American contract law in the twentieth century,
67
 and personally an 
imposing personality, served as President of Duquesne University 
from 1988-2001 and then returned to teach at the Law School until his 
death in 2015. Over the course of that 37-year period, I heard John 
address law students at Orientation and Graduation, the two poles of 
legal education, on dozens of occasions. Without fail, John would end 
his remarks with a reference to Edmund Burke’s speech to Parliament 
on Conciliation with the Colonies in 1775.
68
  Americans, John would 
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say, have “a love of freedom” and they “snuff the approach of tyranny 
in every tainted breeze.”
69
  
Now, why mention that on these occasions? After all, Burke was 
not talking about American lawyers. In a talk to law students, why not 
emphasize dispute resolution or deal making or improving economic 
efficiency or responsibilities to clients, or any of the myriad, important 
topics of a law school education? Yet, in all the years I heard this talk, 
I never heard anyone ask why the quote was relevant. And I am sure 
that my readers have had similar experiences at public occasions at 
other law schools. Many of us intuitively feel that law in America has 
a special relationship to democratic life and that law school is the place 
uniquely suited to preparation for leadership in public life. 
The special role of law in American Democratic life has been the 
main theme in the lifetime work of numerous legal thinkers. It was that 
for my teacher, Charles Black, most particularly in his formative book, 
The People and the Court
70
 and for his colleague, Alex Bickel, 
though from a very different perspective, in The Least Dangerous 
Branch.
71
 It was the core theme of Justice John Marshall Harlan II, 
especially in his view of the unfolding of the jurisprudence of due 
process.
72
 And, in a very different voice, promoting the role of law in 
designing experiments and alternatives in political/economic 
arrangements was the earnest proposal of Roberto Unger in, 
especially, his book, What Should Legal Analysis Become?
73
  
Nor is this a new, twentieth century self-conception of the role of 
law in America. Rachel Moran, the former dean of the UCLA School 
of Law, describes the founding of Indiana Law School in the 1840s in 
similar public terms. 
To remedy concerns about poorly trained lawyers, Indiana 
University pressed to establish a law school beginning in the mid-
1830s. Only in 1842 did the campus succeed when David McDonald, a 
circuit court judge and Bloomington resident, became a professor of 
law.  In Judge McDonald’s inaugural address, he clearly linked formal 
legal education to the foundations of a healthy democracy: 
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Other calamities may [befall] a nation, and it may 
survive them; . . . but when the laws, by which the 
people are governed and protected, have fallen into 
disrepute, revolution or ruin is the inevitable 
consequence. . . . To study our jurisprudence as a 
science, and to be thoroughly learned in its precepts, 
are . . . not only honorable to us [as lawyers] and 
necessary to a wise administration of justice, but of the 




For Dean Moran, the public law school has an especially important 
role in “law and politics”
75
 that is now under attack as visions of the 
public sector shrink in preference to market-based decision-making, 
which had been the preferred domain of private law schools. She sees 
an ideological dispute over the extent to which Americans want 




But this difference between public and private law schools is really 
an in-house dispute—an exaggerated distinction. Market-based 
reforms to solve social problems is a way of doing politics, not an 
elimination of politics. That is why Ronald Reagan was elected 
President of the United States and not appointed CEO. So, even in an 
era of deregulation spearheaded by lawyers, the shape of that very 
deregulation is a matter of politics to be addressed in law schools. One 
must still decide how much public regulation and how much private 
autonomy is warranted in different areas. 
In other words, although there might be skepticism when someone 
says, “I am from the government and I’m here to help,”
77
 that is still 
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Once the public/private law school issue is transcended, Dean 
Moran’s lesson for law school education boils down to this—just as 
medical schools train doctors to heal the human body, law schools 
need to train lawyers to heal the body politic. While there would be 
controversies over how one should go about that and what a healed 
body politic would look like—a dispute medical schools don’t have to 
worry about to the same extent—there might well be widespread 
agreement with Dean Moran that this is what law schools are supposed 
to aim at. 
This understanding of the public nature of legal education is not 
surprising. American public life functions around a Constitution as its 
fundamental law. Once the Supreme Court held in Marbury v. 
Madison that the Constitution could be enforced in ordinary lawsuits 
in court,
79
 it was probably inevitable that the legal profession would 
assume a public role as the protector of American Democracy. 
Lawyers would be bringing and defending cases that would define our 
rights as citizens and specify the details of the structure of American 
government—and lawyers as judges would be deciding these cases. 
In recent years, a great deal about American Democracy has been 
decided by the Supreme Court. Obviously this is true in the law of 





  to cite only two of the most 
controversial areas. But it is true even of more mundane issues, such as 
legislative apportionment and the constitutionality of direct democracy 
reforms—referenda, recalls and the like
82
—and issues of residency.
83
 
As influential as the Supreme Court has been through election law 
cases, the Court has had much more of an impact on American 
Democracy than just in these specific areas. Democracy does of course 
concern matters such as how office holders are selected and what they 
do. But democracy is also a spirit of inquiry, as John Dewey 
emphasized.
84
 So, insofar as the Supreme Court helps keep Americans 
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free, and public debate open, the Court is contributing to the growth 
and maintenance of democracy.
85
 And this judicial product is a 
function of the work of lawyers, who are trained in that work in law 
schools. 
If law schools inherently have this democratic role, the more 
provocative question is, how well are America’s law schools 
performing? In terms of the theme of this article, how well are law 
schools addressing the breakdown of American Democracy? 
The answer is, not well at all. In fact, the issue has not even really 
come up. Rather than attempt to show this globally, I will demonstrate 
the failure with two illustrations: the overall response of law schools to 
the economic downturn of 2008 and the recent theme of the January 
2017 Annual Meeting of the American Association of Law Schools—
the AALS—Why Law Matters. 
It is no secret that American Law Schools today are under 
enormous pressure. Since the 2008 recession, the number of students 
taking the LSAT, a rough measure of the potential law student market, 
has dropped by around 40%.
86
 At the same time, and obviously 
related, the number of good-paying jobs in the legal profession has 
also declined.
87




The effect of all these changes is that a larger percentage of 
graduating law students will not pass the bar exam or, if they do, will 
not find a job in the legal profession, or if they do, will not earn 
enough to comfortably pay back their student loans. These facts have 
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been widely reported in the media,
89
 undoubtedly leading to further 
declines in the number of law school applicants. Some law schools are 
affected less by these factors and some more, but all but the leading 
schools are substantially changed since 2008.
90
 These pressures on law 




It is a little surprising that this crisis led to questioning the methods 
and purpose of legal education. After all, the crisis could be described 
as a simple drop in demand, which could then be assuaged by a simple 
reduction in the supply of law school graduates. Earlier declines in the 
demand for dentists, for example, with similar impact on dental 




Yet, this is not the case with law schools. In responding to the 
changes in demand, law schools are engaging in substantive changes 
in legal education. Despite the lack of evidence that law school 
graduates lacked legal skills in the past, law schools, under pressure 
from the American Bar Association, are providing more experiential 
learning and more skills-oriented courses.
93
 From the perspective of 
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this paper, this changed orientation is a distraction from the role of law 
schools in the study of, and commitment to, American Democracy.
94
 
It should now even be possible to demonstrate that distraction from 
a concern for American Democracy, because of another ABA-
mandated response to the crisis in law schools: the requirement of 
learning outcomes assessments. The ABA is beginning to require 
specified learning outcomes and attempted assessment of the 




The specification of learning outcomes in law school classes need 
not degenerate into simplistic, easily measurable skills, as some fear.
96
 
Specification of proposed outcomes merely requires a law school to 
specify, in effect, what it is attempting to teach its students, in general 
and in particular courses. In other words, the outcomes/assessment 
movement is not theoretically attempting to move legal education 
away from the thinking that characterizes a serious academic 
discipline, into a specified skill set more appropriate for a craft 
endeavor. Learning outcomes can address the goals of legal education 
in any context.
97
 The specificity of assessing such outcomes then 
allows a judgment as to what a law school considers the goals of legal 
education to be. 
To judge whether law schools consider the flourishing of 
American Democracy to be a primary responsibility, and the need to 
equip students to contribute to that flourishing a primary goal, one can 
then just look at the institutional learning outcomes a law school 
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specifies. Helpfully, one widely used guide on the subject includes 
examples of overall institutional outcomes from five American Law 
Schools.
98
 While all five law schools promote ethical conduct, service 
to the community and moral values, none of the schools list perfecting 
American Democracy as among their institutional goals. Nor do they 
suggest such a concern in other terms. Of course, five schools is only a 
tiny sample, but the presence of these five examples in a Guide 
presented by national experts presumably in workshops across the 
country as a helpful starting point for designing institutional learning 
outcomes, at least suggests that nothing genuinely necessary has been 
consistently left out.
99
  If a study were made of all law school 
institutional outcomes, I am afraid that the result would be the same. 
Democracy is not our theme. 
While the new emphasis on skills and the absence of stated 
concern for the flourishing of American Democracy in institutional 
learning outcomes among law schools are troubling, the concerns 
suggested by the choice of theme for the 2017 Annual Meeting of the 
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American Association of Law Schools—Why Law Matters
100
 —
is mystifying, given the current crisis in American public life. Surely 
the theme for the 2017 Meeting should have been something like, 
What is Wrong with American Democracy?
101
  
Aside from not meeting the needs of the hour, the AALS theme is 
both embarrassing—imagine a national group of physicists meeting 
around the theme, Why Physics Matters—and obvious—law recently 
imposed gay marriage on the whole country,
102
 for example, so 
obviously law matters. In fact, most Americans probably feel that law 
and lawyers already matter too much. 
It may be that what Dean Testy intended in this theme was actually 
something else—not Why Law Matters, but Why the Rule of Law 
Matters. Here is what she said in announcing the theme: 
[W]e need to make the case now for why law matters 
and the academy’s vital role in advancing respect for 
and understanding of the rule of law.
103
  
If this is the meaning of the theme, the question is whether it is 
needed. Is there a crisis today over public acceptance of the rule of 
law? Certainly not in theory. To the extent that the public rejects 
controversial decisions by the Supreme Court—cases like 
Obergefell
104
 and Citizens United
105
 —critics would probably assert 
that the decisions are without adequate justification. In other words, 
the criticism would be that the Justices are not following the rule of 
law, but are imposing their own value judgments on the country. 
In practice, however, the intense political struggle over the 
replacement for the late Justice Antonin Scalia demonstrates that the 
Supreme Court has in fact become a government of men and not of 
law. The future direction of the Court depends to a very great extent—
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and is publically perceived as depending—on the ideology of this 
replacement Justice on an ideologically divided Court. So, one could 
say that a renewed commitment to the rule of law is absolutely needed 
today. And the actual achievement of a rule of law versus subjectively 
defined legal values, might then be part of a needed response to the 
breakdown of American Democracy. 
But if this is the point that Dean Testy was making, the most recent 
Annual Meeting of the AALS will have proven most revolutionary 
indeed. For, as Steven Smith pointed out in his very important 2004 
book, Law’s Quandary,
106
 it is the relativistic and nihilistic rhetoric 
and understanding of lawyers, including law professors, that is no 
longer consistent with a rule of law. Smith hopes that we do not mean 
what we say, and that lawyers actually, though tacitly, remain 
committed to the rule of law—but Smith offers little support for that 
hope.
107
 Contrary to Dean Testy’s statement, it is not the public that 
needs to be shown the importance of the rule of law. Indeed, the public 
probably assumes what she states the public must be shown, namely 
that law professors advance the rule of law and believe in it. It is 
actually law professors who need to be persuaded that the rule of law 
is even possible. 
And without a commitment to the rule of law, law professors 
become just another part of the breakdown in American public life. 
We are also partisan and partial. Our legal discussions too often are 
just politics in another form. We debate cases as if we were judges and 
overstate our positions as if we were advocates. Like everyone else, 
law professors fail to seek common ground and fail to think in the 
longer term for the good of all. 
If I am right, even in part, then the AALS theme defending the rule 
of law could have been crucial. But there is no indication that the 2017 
Annual Meeting actually began to grapple with the unpleasant truth 
that one important impediment to the rule of law is the legal academy 
itself. 
The breakdown of faith in the possibility of a rule of law suggests 
the spiritual nature of the breakdown of American Democracy. But 
that conclusion must await further development below. Here, I only 
mean to suggest that law schools are not currently engaged in a serious 
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investigation of the causes, implications and possible responses to, the 
breakdown of American Democracy. This failure by the legal academy 
defines a legitimate and necessary role for religious law schools. 
Religious law schools could become a model in the study of, and care 
for, American Democracy. 
III. WHY AMERICA’S RELIGIOUS LAW SCHOOLS ARE AN 
APPROPRIATE PLACE TO BEGIN 
It could be argued that religiously-affiliated law schools are not the 
ideal place to begin in addressing the breakdown of American 
Democracy. Dean Moran, for example, can be read as suggesting that 
the proper place to begin would be America’s public law schools.
108
 Public law schools have a natural connection to political life 
that religious law schools traditionally lack. Plus, public law schools in 
theory reflect the entire community in a way that religious law schools 
do not. 
While all this is true, public law schools have not taken up this 
democratic role. In addition, religious law schools have certain 
advantages in the midst of the breakdown, just because they are 
religiously oriented. 
A. Religious Traits Are Needed Now in Law Schools 
Certain institutional traits are necessary to sustain reflection upon 
the health and future of democracy. I am labelling these traits religious 
not because only religious people have them, but because religious law 
schools have been slower than their secular counterparts to lose them 
in the general decline America has been experiencing. 
The first trait is mission. As suggested above, many law schools 
today are just trying to stay open. Because of the downturn in 
applications, law schools are lowering the standards for students’ 
entering credentials. In addition, law schools are doing whatever they 
can to attract students. All of this has the effect of turning legal 
education into a consumer-driven enterprise. Law schools are also 
getting smaller, cutting costs and receiving subsidies from the central 
University. No one wants to be the first to close a law school.
109
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Religious law schools are not immune to these pressures. They 
also must pay their bills. But there is among these schools a 
countervailing force opposed to consumer demand. If the only way for 
a religious law school to remain open were to compromise its religious 
mission, there would be a greater willingness to consider closing the 
school than there would be at a nonreligious law school. 
The countervailing force of a religious mission also means that 
religious law schools tend to be open to a bigger picture of the study of 
law than are nonreligious schools. The current crisis in legal education 
might prevent a nonreligious law school from considering its 
responsibility for the health of American Democracy. I can imagine 
the dean at most law schools arguing that this is just not the time for 
anything but a pragmatic emphasis on skills training and jobs after 
graduation. But a religious law school cannot really surrender to such a 
view. 
Again, there will be temptations to give in to these concerns at 
religious law schools, too. But such temptations will not be the only 
factors considered. And there will always be voices among the faculty 
and the Administration calling a religious institution toward a different 
direction. 
The second religious trait that renders religious law schools 
potentially appropriate for thinking about the breakdown of American 
Democracy is a commitment to Truth. I have to be clear about what I 
mean by Truth. Of course, I don’t mean that nonreligious people, of 
which I am one, are dishonest. By Truth, I am referring to the current 
cultural certainty that there is no ultimate Truth about the way things 
are—no ordering intelligence and no fundamental goodness in reality. 
Human life is an accident and has no transcendent aspect. Or, as 
Pontius Pilate put it: “What is truth?”
110
 This denial of Truth has 
become the starting point for American secularism as well as for many 
RINO’s—religious in name only.
111
  
The way that C.S. Lewis described the commitment to Truth—
although he did not limit this belief to religious people but included 
classic philosophy—is that under a theory of objective value, there is 
“‘the belief that certain attitudes are really true, and others really false, 
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111
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to the kind of thing the universe is and the kind of things we are. . . 
.’”
112
 The attitude that Lewis was describing greatly aids the study of 
democratic breakdown because, at least in theory, if there is a truth 
about human flourishing, then people’s appropriate needs, and the 
appropriate response to those needs, can be figured out. Law then can 
really be dedicated to human flourishing in a scientific sense. Without 
the commitment to Truth, law can only be an arena of power struggle, 
which is what it has become. 
It is not an insult to nonreligious people to observe that Truth is 
under challenge in large parts of secular society.
113
 Indeed, I have 
written that this is precisely the crisis in secularism today.
114
 This challenge to Truth is a part of the breakdown of 
democracy because, for politics to work, there must be some sense that 
not everything is a zero sum game in which my gain is your loss. Both 
sides have to share a faith that there is a Truth about reality that allows 
everyone to benefit. Without that commitment, there literally cannot 
be a common good. 
This commitment to Truth is very close to what Professor Simon 
noted years ago, above, as lacking in the general society, but still at 
least potentially present in a religious law school. Religious law 
schools constitute a forum in which discussion about morality can still 
credibly go on as more than an exchange of irreconcilable opinions. 
Obviously, religious people and religious traditions, disagree, 
sometimes vociferously, about some of the content of Truth. But they 
don’t disagree that there is a basic Truth about human flourishing, and 
by extension, about the way democracy could contribute to human 
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The final religious trait that renders religious law schools an 
appropriate starting point will sound strange even to the ears of some 
religious believers. By any standard, American society is in a mess 
right now in terms of human solidarity. We don’t trust each other. 
From a secular perspective, that kind of condition has to be someone’s 
fault—of course usually one’s political opponent. We act as if there 
must be a villain. 
In traditional Judeo-Christian thought, however, that kind of 
human agency is not assumed. From that religious perspective, there 
does not have to be a human cause in order for bad things to keep 
happening. The traditional term for a kind of social impasse in which 
progress is frustrated is the “principalities and powers.” In his 
magisterial, three volume work on the Powers,
116
 Walter Wink 
debunks the notion that this term at origin referred to spiritual entities, 
like a literal Satan. Rather we can think of the principalities and 
powers as the institutional aspects of evil, or, if that term is religiously 
loaded, even just the institutional aspects of breakdown.
117
 The point 
is, there can be headwinds against social health. I would say there are 
such headwinds now. And the first step away from scapegoating is the 
simple acknowledgment that not every problem or incapacity is the 
fault of some human being. 
We can think about this as a phenomenon of history. It is possible 
to be living within a historical moment in which there just are no good 
options.
118
 Human beings are not always and in every way the 
masters of their fate. Thinking about impasse in this way is alien to the 
secular, individualistic, material, modern and post-modern 
consciousness. But thinking in a context of impasse may be the only 
kind of thinking that is realistic. 
If in these three ways, religious law schools are an appropriate 
place to start thinking seriously about the breakdown of American 
Democracy, it must also be acknowledged that there is a 
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corresponding problem of bias affecting religious law schools in these 
matters. For institutional reasons, must religious law schools not 
ultimately regard religion as a necessary component of any healthy 
society? But does that not mean that the answer to the question of what 
is wrong with American Democracy, is already known? The answer 
religious law schools must give, at least as an institutional judgment, is 
that America has turned its back on God, and on the commitments of 
that particular law school’s religious institutional sponsor, and that is 
why society has gone so wrong. 
This objection has some validity. But, let me respond in two ways. 
First, I am speaking here of a place to begin thinking about American 
Democracy. There is no place to begin that is value neutral and 
without prior commitments. If religious law schools have a bias about 
the necessary role of religion, it will be corrected as the conversation 
they begin spreads out to other portions of the community; first in 
nonreligious law schools and then in the American society generally. 
Perhaps more significant, though, than correction from the outside, 
is the role of radical critique within the religious traditions. In the same 
way that the separation of church and state was first a theological 
commitment
119
 and only later became a legal principle, religious 
law schools are far more able to identify their own prejudices than are 
most other legal institutions. 
In any event, if there is a serious problem with my emphasizing the 
role of religious law schools in revitalizing American Democracy, then 
let nonreligious law schools take up the matter and demonstrate their 
open and adventurous approach to thinking about American 
Democracy. 
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B. The Breakdown of American Democracy Has a Spiritual 
Dimension 
Let me remind the reader of what has been argued to this point: if 
there is a breakdown of American Democracy, law schools have a 
special responsibility to seek to understand the breakdown and to seek 
remedies, if there are any; religious law schools are an appropriate 
place to begin that process, whatever is the source of the breakdown. 
Indeed, thinking about the source is what the process of responsibility 
for the health of American Democracy would entail. So, that part of 
my argument does not depend on what comes next in this section. 
Whatever the investigation of American Democracy ultimately 
reveals, that study should have a core place in law schools and 
religious law schools are a proper place to begin. 
Nevertheless, I do have a view of the nature of the breakdown of 
democracy and it is related to the nature of religious law schools. I 
anticipated it in my reference above to the absence of a commitment to 
Truth in the larger, secular society.
120
 Religious law schools are the 
proper place to begin thinking about the breakdown of American 
Democracy because that breakdown is in part a spiritual breakdown—
a pervasive sense of a lack of meaning. Therefore, the proper response 
to the breakdown must be a spiritual response. When I say a spiritual 
response will be necessary, I am not referring to the dogmatic 
commitments of the religious traditions.
121
 But, on the other hand, if 
the problem in democracy is in any sense spiritual, then discussion 
about American Democracy cannot really go forward in a place in 
which consideration of the religious aspect of life is blocked at the 
start. What precisely a spiritual response can mean in the context of 
secular society admittedly remains a matter for further thought. 
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My view about the nature of the breakdown is not idiosyncratic.
122
 
The perception that part of the problem in American Democracy is a 
lack of meaning, is sometimes stated by politicians themselves. Here is 
a description of the view of Ben Sasse, Republican Senator from 
Nebraska in a story about the problem Republican leadership has with 
Donald Trump: 
I asked Sasse if America’s fascination with celebrity 
might help explain the rise of Trump. No, he said. 
“There is such crisis of shared vision for what America 
means right now,” Sasse, a Harvard-trained former 
college president and business consultant, said. 
“People desperately seek shallower pop culture as a 
form of escape rather than finding actual meaning.” 
For politics to be satisfying, it requires deeper ideals. 
And to partake of it as just another celebrity snack food 
leads a citizen to feel, after a while, “like you’ve eaten 
a crap-ton of cotton candy.”
123
  
Against this claim about the spiritual nature of the breakdown of 
American Democracy, there would be an obvious retort from both the 
political left and right. It would be said that the problems in American 
Democracy are basically material. And, indeed, the source of the 
material problem might be agreed upon by both left and right—
Americans are angry and resentful because the income and economic 
prospects of ordinary people are stagnating, if not declining.
124
 The resentment that this causes leads to the democratic 
pathologies identified above: suspicion, polarization, scapegoating and 
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so forth. If people feel that they have been taken advantage of, it is 
hard to work together toward a common good out of which all can 
benefit. 
Although perhaps agreeing on the source of dissatisfaction, the left 
and the right do differ in their diagnoses of the cause of this economic 
stagnation. For the left, the ultimate cause is the greed of the top 1%. 
The wealthy gobble up all of the material gains in society and leave 
little or nothing for everyone else. Rich individuals and powerful 
corporations inhibit worker organization, depress wages, ship well-
paying jobs overseas, lobby politicians, co-opt regulatory regimes, 
monopolize the media, corrupt scientific research and ultimately 
threaten the planet. People are right to feel that the game is rigged and 
the rich are the people and the interests who do the rigging. 
On the right, the understanding of stagnation is different. 
Government interference keeps talented people from innovating the 
products and services that would make life better for everyone. This 
interference can take the form of burdensome and unnecessary 
regulations that create barriers to entry or high taxes that remove the 
incentives that encourage innovation and hard work. In addition, the 
entitlement culture that necessitates such high taxes itself drains the 
entrepreneurial spirit of the people and undermines the social 
discipline that material advance requires. The only people who really 
benefit from all these social programs are the government bureaucrats 
who run them. Ordinary people are actually hurt, whether they receive 
benefits from these programs or not. 
Perhaps one of these accounts is correct. Or perhaps they are both 
correct to some extent. Undoubtedly, after eight years of sluggish 
economic growth following the very deep recession of 2008, the 
American people are unhappy with their material circumstances. Yet, 
overall American economic performance has not been that bad, 
especially compared with the economic performance of the rest of the 
world. America is not actually worse off economically than in 2007. 
Some people, like coal workers, are suffering badly. But most people 
are not.
125
 For all the criticism of the new inequality, average real 
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Heritage Foundation, which has no political interest in supporting President 
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wages have not fallen.
126
 Economic conditions do not seem 
sufficient to explain the current level of political dissatisfaction. 
To take a famous historical example, it required earlier 
hyperinflation and then Depression in 1929, to undermine democracy 
in Weimar Germany.
127
 If the source of our political impasse 
were solely material, you would expect much more serious economic 
conditions than America is experiencing. Undoubtedly, economic 
stagnation is playing a role. But it is not the whole story. 
Not only are material conditions seemingly insufficient as the 
cause, current material conditions are not consistent with the deadlock 
we are seeing. Given these economic accounts, what is preventing 
agreement upon a series of compromises in which the minimum wage 
is raised, entitlements are scaled back and an easing of regulations on 
both unions and businesses is granted? The answer is that the spirit of 
compromise itself is lacking. Americans today are incapable of 
working together to solve our fundamental problems. Why is that? 
Neither of these accounts explains why stagnation in wage growth 
should lead to such a massive and counterproductive reaction. 
Nor do these material accounts explain the scapegoating that each 
account promotes. Are the rich simply parasites? Does the political left 
deny the role of wealth in promoting innovation? Conversely, are 
government programs all bad? Does the right deny that there are poor 
people who need help? The welfare state was created over a long 
period of time. Why should it be so severely challenged now from 
both left and right? Economic accounts fail to explain the anger we see 
in American public life. 
The economic accounts leave out the spiritual wasteland that 
America has become. We are now living with the accumulated impact 
of secularism on social morale. I have elsewhere called this the crisis 
in American secularism but I had not linked it before to the breakdown 
of American Democracy.
128
 The secular chickens are now coming 
home to roost politically. 
                                                                                                                   
Obama’s policies, which is made clear in the Report, it is probably a fair 
barometer of gradual, modest betterment in people’s lives. 
126
 See id. 
127
 Despite a middle period of “comparative peace and prosperity,” from 1924-1929, 
the hyperinflation of 1919-1923 and the Great Depression from 1930-1933, 
ensured “that the Weimar regime never really took root.” RICHARD L. CARSON, 
COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS: VOL. II, TRANSITION AND CAPITALIST 
ALTERNATIVES 399 (2d ed., 1988). 
128
 LEDEWITZ, CHURCH, STATE, supra note 114, at 171. 
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It is not just religious critics who understand the potential crisis of 
meaning in secularism. Of the New Atheists, Philip Kitcher has best 
described the implications of scientific discovery for ordinary human 
consciousness.
129
 Kitcher writes about this in the context of 
evolutionary theory, but his point is just as germane if the starting 
point were the Big Bang instead: 
Christian resistance to Darwin rests on the genuine 
insight that life without God, in the sense of a 
Darwinian account of the natural world, really does 
mean life without God in a far more literal and 
unnerving sense. Even those who understand, and 
contribute to, the enlightenment case can find the 




Kitchner acknowledges that what makes this scientific account
131
 
of existence unbearable for human beings is that it is no longer 
obvious “how lives can matter,”
132
 not only in the sense of the 
absence of a providential deity, but in its endorsement of a universe 
dominated by accident and chance, in which human significance is an 
illusion. It is ultimately an accident that we are here and an accident 
that there even is a here. 
This is unbearable because it is in the nature of human beings to 
seek significance.
133
 As a character in E.L. Doctorow’s novel City of 
God puts it, humans pursue an ultimate purpose that we do not know 
                                                 
129
 See Ledewitz, New Secularism, supra note 112, at 12 (describing Kitcher’s place 
in the New Atheist movement). 
130
 PHILIP KITCHER, LIVING WITH DARWIN EVOLUTION, DESIGN, AND THE FUTURE OF 
FAITH 156 (2007). 
131
 See id. As will be expressly stated below, Kitcher’s view is not really science. It 
has scientific aspects, but its overall conclusion about the meaning of life is not a 
scientific claim. I use the term scientific account because that is often the way 
these matters are presented, as a clash between science and religion. 
132
 Id. at 165. 
133
 I have elsewhere quoted Neil deGrasse Tyson in the Cosmos series as capturing 
both the human need for significance and its alleged illusory, almost pathetic, 
character under scientific secularism: “Tyson says of human beings, ‘We hunger 
for significance. For signs that our personal existence is of special meaning to the 
universe. To that end, we are all too eager to deceive ourselves and others. To 
discern a sacred image in a grilled cheese sandwich.’” Ledewitz, Five Days, 
supra note 108, at 125 (quoting Cosmos: A Spacetime Odyssey: When Knowledge 
Conquered Fear (Fox Network television broadcast, March 23, 2014)). 
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but which has given us “one substantive indication of itself—that we, 
as human beings, live in moral consequence.”
134
 This scientific 
account deprives human beings of the essence of their humanity by 
depriving the world of ultimate significance. 
Well, why can’t we just be responsible for our own significance? 
Because significance does not work that way. What we want to know 
is that our strivings actually matter—not just that we believe, or even 
decide, that they matter. Here is how Bernard Longergan describes the 
difference: 
Is the universe on our side, or are we just gamblers 
and, if we are gamblers, are we not perhaps fools, 
individually struggling for authenticity and collectively 
endeavoring to snatch progress from the ever mounting 
welter of decline? The question arises and, clearly, our 
attitudes and our resoluteness may be profoundly 
affected by the answers. Does there or does there not 
necessarily exist a transcendent, intelligent ground of 
the universe? Is that ground or are we the primary 
instance of moral consciousness.
135
  
Of course, the anti-religion side in the West has known for a long 
time that its success would deprive ordinary people of “comfort,” as 
Kitcher puts it.
136
 But what if the effect of the cultural shift away from 
religion is more diffuse than declining rates of church attendance and 
the demographic growth of the “nones?”
137
 What if the effect is to 
deprive people of the sense of a common good and of the importance, 
or even possibility, of Truth? And what if this effect is felt even by 
                                                 
134
 E.L. DOCTOROW, CITY OF GOD 256 (2000). This quote is at the heart of my 
2009 book about secularism, HALLOWED SECULARISM: THEORY, BELIEF, 
PRACTICE 7-8 (2009). 
135
 BERNARD LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY 101-02 (1990). 
136
 KITCHER, supra note 130, at 159. 
137
 The “nones,”—people who answer “none” to questions of religious affiliation, 
now constitute a little less than one-quarter of American adults. See generally 
U.S. Public Becoming Less Religious, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 3, 2015), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/11/03/u-s-public-becoming-less-religious/ 
[https://perma.cc/3LBM-DW52]. 
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people who still consider themselves to be religious?
138
 That is, what if 
the culture is now poisoned?
139
  
If all that were the case, a communal undertaking like democracy 
would become impossible. Democracy, with its attendant sacrifices 
and faith in the future, only makes sense in a universe that makes 
sense. This can be understood as a matter of trust. The nation might 
put its trust in God, as in our national motto, or in a particular figure—
a Washington or a Lincoln or an FDR. Or, the nation might put its trust 
in the constitutional structure of government and thus grant legitimacy 
to its leaders and outcomes overall, even when there are particular 
disagreements. But today, America feels incapable of trust. Perhaps 
this lack of trust is a result only of specific disappointments—
Vietnam, Watergate, the Iraq War, Islamic terrorism, the 2008 
recession, shootings by and of the police, Trump’s absurdities, 
Clinton’s emails—but it feels larger. 
You get a different kind of politics when the universe is only 
chaos—when the only rational thing to do is maximize an individual’s 
short-term advantages before the light goes out in his personal life and 
in the life of the species. You get a politics in which a current 
generation risks altering the climate of a planet rather than restrict its 
own material benefits. You get a politics in which persuasion toward 
the truth no longer is felt to be an option, in which there can only be 
political warfare among preferences.
140
  
                                                 
138
 This is, after all, still three-quarters of the population, a very high percentage—
”still remarkably high by comparison with other advanced industrial countries.” 
Id. What if this group is also affected by the felt decline in moral significance? 
139
 Undoubtedly some would say that capitalism itself set the stage for the growth of 
individualism and the collapse of meaning or at least contributed. See, e.g., 
DANIEL BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1976). 
140
 You also get a different kind of life. Charles Murray, looking at the social side of 
the breakdown I am describing, calls for moral hectoring by the wealthy to 
improve the social discipline of the poor. See Charles Murray, The New American 
Divide, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2012), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405297020430140457717073381718164
6 [https://perma.cc/RG9B-S3HA] (“Married, educated people who work hard and 
conscientiously raise their kids shouldn’t hesitate to voice their disapproval of 
those who defy these norms. When it comes to marriage and the work ethic, the 
new upper class must start preaching what it practices.”). Murray fails to 
appreciate that his research shows precisely the same forces more slowly 
affecting the wealthy as well. They now marry less, go to church less and only 
work hard for the moment because they earn so much. That won’t last. 
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I freely acknowledge that it is impossible to prove that the 
scientific account—Weber’s “disenchantment of the world”
141
—is the 
reason American politics have broken down. But it is uncanny how the 
breakdown of American Democracy manifests in the ways that the 
triumph of a scientific worldview along these lines might be expected 
to produce. Secular and scientific thinkers
142
 never intended to 
undermine American Democracy, but I believe that is exactly what has 
happened. 
Members of the legal profession will more easily see this spiritual 
crisis at work in two representative examples from our own legal 
framework. It is easy to overlook how nihilistic the framework of law 
has become and how this nihilism undermines the foundation of free 
speech in persuasion toward truth.
143
  
As a first example, it is surprising to read the explicit acceptance of 
legal realism by Justice Scalia in A Matter of Interpretation, his book 
setting forth his method of statutory and constitutional 
interpretation.
144
 Early in the book, Justice Scalia defends the 
constitutionality of common law judging given the viewpoint of the 
framers, even though such judging has the effect of creating law: 
I do not suggest that Madison was saying that common-
law lawmaking violated the separation of powers. He 
wrote in an era when the prevailing image of the 
common law was that of a pre-existing body of rules, 
uniform throughout the nation (rather than different 
from state to state), that judges merely “discovered” 
rather than created. It is only in this century, with the 
rise of legal realism, that we came to acknowledge that 
judges in fact “make” the common law remedies, and 
that each state has its own.
145
  
                                                 
141
 For discussion of Weber’s disenchantment of the world in modernity, see Duncan 
Kennedy, The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal Rationality, or Max 
Weber’s Sociology in the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal 
Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1050 (2004). 
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 For an illustration of the scientific worldview, see RICHARD DAWKINS, RIVER 
OUT OF EDEN: A DARWINIAN VIEW OF LIFE 133 (1995). 
143
 This is a sketch of nihilism in American law. For those looking for a fuller 
treatment, see Ledewitz, Five Days, supra note 107. 
144
 See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW (1997). 
145
 Id. at 10. 
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The issue in nihilism is not only whether law is made or found. 
What Justice Scalia learned from the legal realists is that substantive 
principles, such as the anti-cruelty principle of the Eighth Amendment, 
are not statements of truth. If they were that, they would be subject to 
interpretation—the principle of cruelty would then be one “that 
philosophers can play with in the future.”
146
 Because Justice Scalia 
assumes that there is no ultimately right answer to the nature of 
cruelty, it would grant too much discretion to judges if cruelty were 
interpreted as an abstract principle. Cruelty has to be, instead, 
something fixed—in Justice Scalia’s view, that something is what a 
particular generation of framers understood cruelty to mean.
147
 Only in 
that way can the meaning of cruelty not be subject to arbitrary will—
arbitrary will here implied by the phrase, “play with.” Thus, 
predictable and determinate outcomes in law are accomplished through 
an arbitrary limit on the meaning of law. 
Justice Scalia’s theory of interpretation rests on the assumption 
that there is no truth about cruelty that human beings might learn. 
Because there is no truth about a matter such as cruelty, interpretations 
of cruelty cannot be judged as either right or wrong. This is how 
Justice Scalia’s method of interpretation rests on nihilism. Ironically, 
the generation that wrote the Eighth Amendment thought they were 
banning cruel punishments. They did not think in terms of “our 
understanding of cruelty.” Thus, it is impossible for this form of 
textualism to be faithful to its purported object. 
As a second example, Robert Katz has done a service in showing 
law’s nihilism in a recent short analysis of the opinions in the 
Obergefell case, particularly the majority opinion by Justice Anthony 
Kennedy and the dissent by Chief Justice John Roberts, in terms of 
Rawlsian public reason.
148
 Public reason describes the types of 
reasons Rawls would allow office holders to use in public debate.
149
 
                                                 
146
 Id. at 145. 
147
 Id. at 40-41. 
148
 Robert Katz, The Role of Public Reason in Obergefell v. Hodges, 11 FIU. L. REV. 
177 (2015). 
149
 Katz uses as a working definition of public reason, “the idea that the ‘moral or 
political rules that regulate our common life be, in some sense, justifiable or 
acceptable to all those persons over whom the rules purport to have authority.’” 
Id. at 177 (quoting Jonathan Quong, Public Reason, THE STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 6 (Edward N. Zalta ed., Summer 2013)), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/public-reason 
[https://perma.cc/B448-EEQR]. 
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These kinds of reasons are not to be dependent on particular moral and 
religious convictions—what Rawls calls comprehensive doctrines.
150
  
According to Katz, it turns out that one cannot be either for or 
against a constitutional right to same sex marriage without arguably 
violating the tenets of public reason.
151
 If one is for the right, one is 
privileging the comprehensive liberalism of John Stuart Mill. If one is 
against the right, one is foisting sectarian religious principles on the 
body politic. Furthermore, in the interests of civility, Justice Kennedy 
suggests that even ordinary citizens may be subject to these critiques 
in their speech in the public square.
152
  
These are roughly the points that Katz shows both Kennedy and 
Roberts make, without their adverting directly to Rawls. Katz says the 
arguments of the Justices are reminiscent of Rawls rather than relying 
on him. But that just shows how deeply embedded a worldview of 
neutrality toward substantive political morality has become in legal 
culture. 
On one level, Katz’s analysis exposes how silly the Rawlsian 
project of politics and law without substantive moral and political 
commitments is. But, on a deeper level, the assumptions of the project 
are quite serious and quite anti-democratic. 
Why should government officials, and to an extent ordinary 
people, be expected to reach political and legal conclusions without 
reference to their most cherished and deepest moral and political 
commitments? Why, in other words, should we limit ourselves to 
public reason? Rawls’s goal was to attain “‘a just and stable society of 
free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable 
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines. . . .’”
153
 Rawls 
thought this could best be done by limiting the grounds of government 
                                                 
150
 Id. at 178. 
151
 Thus, according to Katz, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion criticizes opponents 
of same sex marriage for impliedly violating “a duty to refrain from advocating 
and voting for laws that cannot be justified on grounds that are intelligible or 
potentially acceptable to fellow citizens who do not share one’s creed”, while the 
Roberts dissent criticizes the majority for fostering their own “preferred creed.” 
Id. at 184, 186. 
152
 Katz asks expressly why Justice Kennedy addresses these ordinary citizens: “One 
wonders why Kennedy discusses ordinary citizens who oppose [same sex 
marriage] at all.” Id. at 185. 
153
 Id. (quoting JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xviii (1993)). 
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action to “‘reasons that all reasonable persons could endorse.’”
154
 This means avoiding political and legal reliance on 
comprehensive doctrines of right and wrong upon which citizens 
might disagree. 
What makes the Rawlsian project impossible to attain, as Katz’ 
analysis shows,
155
 is that politics and law are normative endeavors. In 
this realm, one always acts out of some kind of morality. The effect of 
including some moral claims as appropriate and excluding others, 
usually has the effect of manipulating political and legal debate so as 
to favor some particular policy outcome. This occurred most 




What makes the Rawlsian project not just impossible to attain, but 
actually anti-democratic in principle, is its assumption that our deepest 
moral and religious commitments are incommensurate. We literally 
have nothing to say to each other on the deepest matters of public life. 
There is no serious likelihood of political persuasion because the 
whole account presumes that there is no possibility of learning the 
substantive truth about any of these political matters.
157
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 Id. at 179. 
155
 I don’t mean to attribute this view to Professor Katz. In the article, he remains 
strictly agnostic. See id. at 188 (noting that “[w]hile [his article] identified many 
questions raised by a public reason reading of [the Roberts and Kennedy 
Obergefell opinions], it has not addressed them on the merits.”). 
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 RAWLS, supra note 153, at 243 n.32 (1993). For discussion, see John Finnis, 
Public Reason, Abortion, and Cloning, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 361, 368-70 (1998). 
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 Even Rawls’ concept of “overlapping consensus” to grant legitimacy in political 
matters, which has been regarded as supportive of persuasion and legitimacy, see 
Christopher J. Peters, Persuasion: A Model of Majoritarianism as Adjudication, 
96 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 33-36, is indifferent to actual persuasion, concerning itself 
only with the theoretical acceptability of reasons people give for their positions. 
Martha Nussbaum, one of Rawls’s most sympathetic and accomplished 
interpreters, illustrates why actual persuasion is generally assumed not to happen: 
      In all modern democracies we find “a diversity of opposing and 
irreconcilable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines.” Even 
though at some point in history people may have believed that these 
differences would disappear over time, as the true religion gradually 
won out over its rivals, that has not happened. Differences about 
religion and the ultimate meaning of life are robust, and it is 
implausible to think that they are the result of errors of the sort that 
could be dispelled by rational argument. 
 MARTHA NUSSBAUM, INTRODUCTION TO RAWLS’S POLITICAL LIBERALISM 1, 2 
(2015) (quoting RAWLS, supra note 153, at 3-4). Nussbaum’s premise confuses 
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Democracy and the First Amendment are premised on a very 
different assumption. We are supposed to argue about something like 
gay marriage and try to convince each other. The Constitution does put 
certain commitments beyond the reach of ordinary politics, but even in 
terms of these constitutional rights, one will be debating the nature and 
depth of the right—in this case the right to marry. As I have elsewhere 
stated in criticizing the Obergefell majority opinion, the only 
legitimate and convincing way to support a constitutional right of gay 
marriage is to assert, and try to show, that as a matter of fundamental 
political morality, the conventional and religious opposition to gay 
marriage is mistaken.
158
 As arrogant as it may sound, one must be 
willing to assert that opponents of gay marriage are wrong—not 
“bigoted”, but wrong nevertheless.
159
 
                                                                                                                   
religious and moral commitments, which are generally not the stuff of political 
life, with what generally has to be decided in politics. So, I can hope to persuade 
someone that abortion, or the death penalty, or the oppression of women and 
gays, are wrong without formally converting the other person to my religion or 
philosophical position. Over time, given history, this is exactly what happens in 
human discourse. 
158
 Ledewitz, Five Days, supra note 107, at 146 (contrasting the willingness of 
opponents of segregation to label segregationist views as morally wrong, 
compared to Justice Kennedy’s unwillingness to do that in the majority opinion in 
Obergefell). 
159
 In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts accuses the majority opinion of portraying 
opponents of gay marriage as “bigoted.” Obergefell, 576 U.S. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 
2626. But on the pages referred to in the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy 
asserts only that the ban on gay marriage imposes stigma and injury. That 
imputation is sort of inevitable in banning gay marriage. Obviously the ban 
implies that a gay couple who believe they are the equivalent of a heterosexual 
couple are not. The actual structure of the majority opinion is the listing of 
reasons why marriage is a fundamental right and then to assert that these “reasons 
apply with equal force to same-sex couples.” Id. at 2599. This places the burden 
of persuasion, so to speak, on opponents of gay marriage to show that gay 
couples are different. This approach actually avoids having to say plainly that 
assertions of difference are mistaken. Certainly it tries to avoid directly moral 
claims about gay relationships that conflict with those of opponents of gay 
marriage. Here is the key passage that suggests that opponents may not use the 
machinery of the State to impose their religious and moral views, avoiding any 
suggestion that the majority, of necessity, is doing exactly that: 
     Many who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that 
conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or philosophical 
premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged here. But 
when that sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted law and 
public policy, the necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of 
the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes 
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Despite its goal, the Rawlsian project does not succeed in avoiding 
deep-seated political conflict. Instead, it papers over such conflicts and 
attempts to banish one side from the debate. Because it assumes that 
political and legal disagreements cannot be intelligently debated at 
their deepest level, the Rawlsian framework is part of the spiritual 
breakdown of American Democratic life. With Rawls, politics 
inevitably becomes a battle of irreconcilable assertions. 
In describing the breakdown of democracy as spiritual, I am not 
suggesting either that one cannot be good without God or that we 
should somehow become religious believers because nonbelief is bad 
for the culture. As to the first point, the question is not how to be good 
without God,
160
 but whether and how anyone can be good when the 
cultural assumption is that there isn’t any such thing as the good. All 
judgments about the right thing to do become subjective and 
indefensible. As to the second point, people do not choose whether to 
live in a culture in which unselfconscious belief in God is possible. 
Once you live in a culture in which belief in God is merely a choice, 
you cannot render your own belief “natural.” The believer’s belief in 
God is as subject to the charge of subjectivism as is anyone else’s 
belief. And the worst part of this is that the assumptions of nihilism 
and relativism
161
 would never have to be defended. These 
assumptions, rather than the assumptions of religion, become 
“natural.” They become obvious. 
                                                                                                                   
those whose own liberty is then denied. Under the Constitution, 
same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as 
opposite-sex couples, and it would disparage their choices and 
diminish their personhood to deny them this right. 
      Id. at 2602. 
160
 See generally GREG M. EPSTEIN, GOOD WITHOUT GOD: WHAT A BILLION 
NONRELIGIOUS PEOPLE DO BELIEVE (2009). 
161
 Carlo Invernizzi Accetti helpfully distinguishes between nihilism and relativism, 
which he defines as “a second-order (that is, meta-ethical) standpoint consisting 
in the consciousness that all first-order moral judgments depend on a set of prior 
categories and assumptions, which cannot themselves be justified absolutely.” 
CARLO INVERNIZZI ACCETTI, RELATIVISM AND RELIGION: WHY DEMOCRATIC 
SOCIETIES DO NOT NEED MORAL ABSOLUTES 165 (2015). But this approach, he 
maintains, does not deny the existence of moral values as such, as does nihilism. 
Id. at 166. For my purposes, the distinction does not alter the point that in all 
cases, according to Accetti, moral judgments depend on the categories the 
individual chooses to employ. Accetti believes that relativism as he understands it 
can serve as the foundation for democratic life—indeed, that is the point of his 
whole book. I believe that current events are proving him disastrously wrong. 
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If all this is so, how could these matters be changed? It must first 
be acknowledged that perhaps they cannot be changed. No one 
guarantees the health of a culture. And it would not just be American 
culture that is sick. It used to be argued that the supportive and 
compassionate culture of secular Europe’s social welfare states shows 
that secularism is not incompatible with social solidarity. How does 
that argument look now? Secular Europe is proving much more hostile 
to non-European immigrants than is formerly religious America, even 
though America is unfortunately showing a discriminatory side as 
well. 
But if there were a place to begin to challenge nihilism, it would be 
on the point of chance and accident. It is a matter of faith for some in 
the anti-religion camp that the fundamental reality in the universe must 
be a lack of order.
162
 But this is not really a scientific conclusion. 
There are scientific voices who point, instead, to an underlying 
orderliness in reality. For these scientists, what happened during the 
last 14 billion years was almost inevitable.
163
  
If matter inherently comes to be and is then inherently self-
organizing, that can become the rudiment of something rather than 
nothing. If that is the case with matter, then everything is not up for 
grabs.
164
 Moreover, a standard against which meaningfulness can be 
measured begins to form: that which contributes to the unfolding of 
order and complexity is good, or at least better, than that which tends 
to reductionism. 
In a universe of such unfolding order, there is even a place for 
human beings. For we are the ones who discover that order. As Carl 




That perspective could become a new starting point for considering 
human flourishing and communal life, including democracy and law. 
There could be a new science of the potential of the human in the 
cosmos. 
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 See DAWKINS, supra note 142. 
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 For sources, see Ledewitz, New Secularism, supra note 112, at 21-23. 
164
 This is a reference to the sad, aching poem of nihilism that Arthur Leff was 
reduced to in 1979. See Bruce Ledewitz, Seeking ‘Common Ground:’ A Secular 
Statement, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 49, 61 (2010). 
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 Jonathan Cott, The Cosmos: An Interview With Carl Sagan, ROLLING STONE 
(Dec. 25, 1980), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/features/the-cosmos-
19801225 [https://perma.cc/67BM-T5T2]. 
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This understanding of reality would vindicate E.L. Doctorow’s 
character quoted above.
166
 Human beings live a life of ultimate 
purpose—we live a telos. The nature of that telos can be gleaned from 
the fact that humans live in moral consequence. Human beings believe 
that what they do and what they believe is of infinite significance. In 
this understanding of reality, human life does have significance. 
The fundamental problem is not that secular renewal along these 
lines is impossible, but that renewal has not been seen as necessary. 
Until now, the secular movement has been parasitic on the religious 
traditions.
167
 It could criticize these religious traditions for their 
obscurantism and prejudices, but it felt no need to build a flourishing 
secular culture on its own. It did not even discuss the need to do so. 
The breakdown of American Democracy, as it reflects the spiritual 
desert of secularism, exposes that approach as unsustainable and 
dangerous. Secularism has led America to a dead end. Where are the 
current sources of creativity in American secularism? Where is its 
health? Science, though still healthy and productive, is not the product 
of secularism. Science, as we know it, was originally the product of 
pious, Christian Europe. Despite occasional tensions and even 









 has never come to grips with Doctorow’s 
description of what it means to be human. Clearly, the new atheists 
shared the view that humans live in moral consequence. That is why 
they thought it was so important that human beings not believe in God. 
The reason they spent so much effort trying to convince their fellows 
that God does not exist is that they did not want people to believe a lie. 
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 See DOCTOROW, supra note 134, at 256. 
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 For example, in Gregg Epstein’s book, the reason to be good without God is 
“[t]he dignity of mutual concern and connection and of self-fulfillment through 
service to humanity’s highest ideals.” EPSTEIN, supra note 160, at 103. But this is 
a very thin ground as moral motivation. Epstein is able to rest on such a thin 
ground because the Judeo-Christian worldview, and other religious worldviews, 
still dominates. 
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 See Perry Dane, A Holy Secular Institution, 58 EMORY L.J. 1123, 1144 n. 58 
(2009). 
169
 See generally CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, GOD IS NOT GREAT: HOW RELIGION 
POISONS EVERYTHING (2007). 
170
 See KITCHER, supra note 130 and accompanying text. For Doctorow, however, 
living in moral consequence is human life mattering and it is not an illusion. 
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There could be no better illustration of a commitment to ultimate truth 
than that atheistic insistence. 
But, if all reality is an accident based on chance events, then why 
do human beings live in moral consequence? The atheist answer 
should be that we don’t and that the feeling that we do is an illusion.
171
 
That response, however, is not convincing. How is it that the 
universe created creatures with this illusion of significance? One could 
even say that the smarter a creature is, the more it lives in this illusion 
of moral consequence. One can see the development of care and 
compassion and generosity along the evolutionary trail. Humans are as 
we are as the result of a long development. 
I look forward to the day that an atheist takes this question 
seriously and concludes that with a really smart creature, anomy—
normlessness—and its accompanying despair would be a serious 
threat. Therefore, in strict evolutionary theory, the smart creatures with 
a sense of meaning were less likely to give up life, either in suicide or 
just in not escaping from predators. Only the smart creatures with a 
sense of meaning would survive. So the smart species would develop 
this illusion of significance. Even to tell this story is to demonstrate 
how forced and unreal it is. 
But what is the alternative? What if it is true that humans have a 
telos—an ultimate purpose? What if it is true that humans live in moral 
consequence because the universe is actually constructed that way? 
Not everything that makes a secularist would change if there were 
an order like this to reality. Just because the universe makes sense, it 
does not follow that there exists a being like a God who could set aside 
the scientific laws that otherwise govern the universe.
172
 But it 
would mean that the easy affirmation of subjectivism—that anything 
goes, that there is no Truth, and so forth—would have to be 
abandoned. And, it would have to be considered whether the word 
God might somehow apply to the order underlying the universe. 
Insofar as the sickness that afflicts American Democracy roots in 
the soil of nihilism, this change in secularism would affect the 
framework that is undermining American public life. This one change 
could be the beginning of the formation of the coalition of the real that 
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 See Ledewitz, Five Days, supra note 107, at 125-26 (referring to the statement by 
Neil deGrasse Tyson in the Cosmos Series that human beings deceive themselves 
“that our personal existence is of special meaning to the universe.”). 
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 This of course is not the only God there could be, but the meaning of God is 
beyond my scope here. 
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could discover new foundations for meaning and a new acceptance of 
objectivity. 
In this new world, the investigation into democracy that begins in 
America’s religious law schools could expand to all other law schools 
and from there to a discussion in the rest of society. It would no longer 
be the case that one could have a conversation about morality only 
within the confines of religion. In this new world, democracy could be 
renewed. 
But, are we not here a very long way from the God of Israel and 
Jesus Christ and Allah? Given this possible turn in thinking, it must be 
asked whether America’s religious law schools are suitable for this 
task, or whether these law schools might consider a task such as this an 
abdication of their mission. 
IV. SHOULD AMERICA’S RELIGIOUS LAW SCHOOLS TAKE UP THIS 
DEMOCRATIC TASK? 
The task I hope to set for America’s religious law schools has two 
aspects. First, there is the primacy of the breakdown of American 
Democracy as the matter with which American law schools should be 
engaged. Second, there is the question of the secular nature of that 
breakdown and whether a new spirituality is needed to heal American 
public life. 
It is an open question whether these tasks can be undertaken in 
religious law schools and whether they should be. I want to address 
these issues plainly. They are not easily decided. 
I foresee three objections to my proposal, though of course there 
may be other matters I am overlooking. First, there is the issue of 
secular indifference to, actually hostility to, anything religious. 
American culture, especially in its elite manifestations, has embraced 
an unrelenting commitment to various forms of anti-religious rhetoric. 
For example, any State law that seeks to protect religious liberty is 
instantly, and widely, described in the media as a law authorizing 
discrimination against gay people and others.
173
 Some Americans 
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 That is how Indiana’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act, see 2015 IND. LEGIS. 
SERV. P.L. 3-2015 (S.E.A. 101) (West), was greeted when it was signed into law 
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discrimination against any group. The negative reaction was overwhelming, 
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even ask in a serious way, “Why Tolerate Religion?”
174
 If there is 
so little respect for religion as a cultural resource, how could it be 
imagined that there would be any interest in what religious law schools 
might say about American Democracy? So, why should religious law 
schools bother with such a task? 
The second objection is related to the first. In this culture of 
hostility against religion, religious law schools already have a task, one 
they have been attempting to fulfill. Their task is to defend religious 
believers and religious belief, both in terms of the rights of believers 
and in terms of the presence of religion in the public square. In terms 
of individual believers, religious law schools, both institutionally and 
through individual faculty members, have provided intellectual 
foundations and, sometimes, legal arguments for their protection.
175
In 
this culture, there may be few other resource to protect this minority 
group of active and serious believers. 
At the cultural level, religious law schools have been trying to 
maintain a space for public religious expression.
176
 However, 
                                                                                                                   
cover-for-bigotry.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/USH3-773F]. It is surprising to me 
that the left endorses the kind of corporate blackmail to which Indiana was 
subjected. I am waiting for the NBA and other corporations to boycott New York 
and California until those States lower their tax rates. 
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 BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2013). 
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 I don’t mean that only religious law schools provide resources for the protection 
of religious liberty. The Religious Liberty Clinic at Stanford is a prime example 
of a litigation commitment at a secular school. But I believe it is fair to say that 
the institutional focus of religious law schools in this regard is much greater, 
whether primarily as an intellectual endeavor—Saint John’s University School of 
Law Center for Law and Religion; the Emory University School of Law Center 
for Study of Law and Religion; the Institute on Religion, Law & Lawyer’s Work 
at Fordham University School of Law; Regent University School of Law, namely 
its Fall 2016 Law Rev. Symposium on the implications of the Obergefell case—
or in courtroom presence—the University of St. Thomas School of Law Religious 
Liberty Appellate Clinic. As for individual faculty members, while there are 
plenty of exceptions—Douglas Laycock, for example, widely regarded as the 
leading figure in the field, and very active in conceptualizing and defending the 
rights of religious believers, teaches at the University of Virginia. Nevertheless, 
as I am glancing at the Executive Committee of the AALS Section on Law and 
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the Executive Committee, five teach at religious law schools. See Dec. 2015 




 While not all religious law schools engage collectively in such endeavors, a 
number of them do so, such as Saint John’s University School of Law Center for 
 
282 UMass Law Review v. 12 | 230 
commitment to a rigorous separation of church and state, supported by 
skepticism about the value of religion in general, has been gaining 
cultural and political support nationally, although this position has not 
yet been genuinely successful in court.
177
 Previously sustained 
practices like legislative prayer and Christmas holiday displays are 
under increasing political challenge and practices formerly not 
controversial, such as public Ten Commandments displays, are now 
plainly out of bounds in many jurisdictions.
178
 These challenges 
to public religion are certain to increase as society becomes ever more 
secular. 
Given all this, religious law schools may feel justified in adopting 
an openly partisan stance on behalf of religion. From this point of 
view, the kind of open partnership with the culture that I have been 
promoting would abandon believers in particular, and religion in 
general, just when the need for legal champions is greatest. It could be 
said that this is the time for defenders of religion to circle the wagons. 
The third objection is the most significant theologically. As 
William Simon stated at the beginning of this article, this society no 
longer publically speaks the traditional language of faith. Therefore, a 
spiritual engagement with this increasingly secular culture requires 
that religious concerns and values at least be translated into a new kind 
of vocabulary and not be proclaimed in traditional, dogmatic terms. If 
religious law schools were to enter into my proposed relationship with 
the culture, they would have to abjure, in the Christian example, 
simply proclaiming Christ’s lordship in the world. While it might be 
                                                                                                                   
Law and Religion and the Emory Center for Study of Law and Religion. Then 
there is the collective Conference of Religiously Affiliated Law Schools, at 
whose Conference a version of this paper was delivered. For the special role of 
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but religious expression has certainly not been curtailed. See Salazar v. Buono, 
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obvious to religious believers that the breakdown of American 
Democracy would be alleviated through Christian renewal of this 
culture, the very nature of cultural dialogue would inevitably mean 
that this message would not be the only one delivered, or even be the 
message most emphasized. If you speak to the world on worldly 
matters—or matters the world imagines are worldly matters—you 
inevitably end up speaking the language of the world. 
From a certain religious perspective, speaking the language of the 
world is very much the error made by Friedrich Schleiermacher in On 
Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers.
179
 It is precisely the 
approach that Karl Barth rejected.
180
 It is precisely the error made by 
liberal Protestantism and Reform Judaism, which has led to their 
dramatic demographic decline.
181
 In other words, it could be said 
that all attempts to engage the world on the world’s terms are destined 
to fail to meet the actual needs of the world. Only religion on its own 
terms can provide anything worthwhile. And if this means that religion 
is not understood by most people, that is just the usual condition of the 
saving remnant. From this perspective, the crucial matter for religious 
law schools is to remain faithful. This may look like an inward turning, 
but it really amounts to keeping one’s eyes on God. 
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SALON (May 22, 2015), 
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Saving Evangelical Churches, REL. NEWS SERV. (Aug. 10, 2016), 
http://religionnews.com/2016/08/10/why-a-stout-theological-creed-is-not-saving-
evangelical-churches/ [https://perma.cc/MB3E-39B9]. 
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Only the last of these three objections is really opposed to the 
thrust of this article. In terms of the first objection, yes, secular culture 
assumes that religious law schools can have nothing of importance to 
contribute to a fundamental issue like the state of democracy. But if 
democracy is worth taking up, the potential responses by the world to 
the offer cannot determine the course of action. 
In terms of the second objection, yes, it may be that religious law 
schools have an institutional obligation to defend believers and 
religion. But they also have an obligation to free inquiry. Since no 
institution is value free, the commitment to protect the interests of 
believers is no disqualification from democratic study. Any other 
position leaves the study of democracy to those whose commitments 
are hostile to religion. 
In addition, there is no absolute opposition between the two tasks 
of study and defense. The value of protecting religious liberty is 
honored among all civil libertarians, especially at a time when unfair 
attacks on Islam and Muslims are increasing. For example, the 
Summer 2016 issue of the ACLU magazine, Stand, leads with a story 
about countering discrimination against Muslims.
182
 The ACLU has 
been at the forefront of the struggle for gay rights as well, even though 
there, the ACLU opposes the interests of religious believers.
183
 So, 
the concern for democracy that lies at the heart of this article, and the 
concern to protect religious liberty, are not mutually exclusive.
184
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 The official ACLU position is that religious exemptions to anti-discrimination 
laws, including bans against discrimination based on sexual orientation, should 
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our religious beliefs, but this does not give us the right to use our religion to 
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 See Mike Stetz, Best Law Schools for the Devout, 17 PRELAW 28 (Winter 2014), 
http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/cypress/prelaw_2014winter/#/32 
[https://perma.cc/K6NV-MKX8]. The story identified 52 American law schools 
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2017 The Role of Religiously Affiliated Law Schools 285 
The third objection requires a different kind of response. The 
question is whether the responsibility of a religious law school—a 
Christian law school, for example, since most are—begins and ends 
with the proclamation of salvation through Christ. If that is the case, 
then attention to American Democracy is misplaced. 
But a law school is not the Church. The decision of a religious 
denomination to sponsor a law school, which will be open to students 
of all religions and no religion, implies a dimension of secular 
concern.
185
 All religious law schools contribute to the good of 
society in ways that have little to do with any religious message per 
se—the betterment of copyright law, perhaps, or a more efficient tax 
collection system. The context I am raising here—the breakdown of 
American Democracy—looks somewhat different only because it 
raises more fundamental questions. Thus the issues raised here—of 
truth and meaning—are closer to matters of direct concern to religion. 
However, the maintenance and promotion of American Democracy 
remains a proper role for any American law school. 
That is only a partial response, though. Even in purely secular 
matters, I presume a religious law school would not endorse activities 
that directly or indirectly conflict with the fundamental precepts of its 
religious tradition.
186
 If a religious law school points out the spiritual 
decline in American society without directly linking that decline to the 
culture’s rejection of God, has not that law school participated in the 
very spiritual decline that it is decrying? 
I think the answer to that question is no, or at least could be no. 
When Paul wrote his letters to the mixed churches that he had 
founded, with Jewish and Gentile members, he wrote in a way that 
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would be accessible and meaningful to non-Jews.
187
 He did not sound 
the same as Stephen in the Book of Acts recapitulating the history of 
Israel in Jerusalem to the Sanhedrin.
188
 Paul was assuring a hearing by 
a different audience. 
And when Paul addressed the Athenians, likening Christ to the 
unknown God the Athenians already knew,
189
 he was not demeaning 
the Gospel. He was pointing out that the Christian message was not 
alien to the experiences of his non-Jewish listeners. So, there is 
precedent for speaking in a way that the world can hear. It is not more 
faithful to use a religious vocabulary that exacerbates barriers between 
believers and nonbelievers. 
C.S. Lewis, the great Christian popularizer, was obviously a master 
in these matters. Not only did his work, as in the Narnia tales,
190
 
present religious messages in non-dogmatic terms, he also showed that 
at least the rudiments of the Christian message were already held by 
almost everyone.
191
 Such an approach does not compromise a law 
school’s religious mission. 
How does that change in vocabulary apply to the democratic task 
of religious law schools? The most important theological divide in 
America is not over whether God exists. And it is certainly not over 
any policy issues, such as abortion, or war or gay marriage. On those 
matters, conversations can go on as long as there are shared starting 
points. The theological divide concerns those starting points. 
The basic question that divides us is whether life is meaningful. 
Not just meaningful in our opinion, but meaningful. Because, if life is 
meaningful, that is not altogether a human accomplishment. Because, 
if life is meaningful, it follows that judgments about values such as the 
good, the true and the beautiful, are also not altogether human 
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judgments. If life is meaningful, it should be possible to learn 
something real and lasting about the good, the true and the beautiful. It 
should be possible to decide that some claims and positions are further 
away from the real and lasting and others are closer—even if, in the 
nature of things, all of our claims and positions are largely false and 
misguided. We see through a glass darkly, but we still see something. 
This is more than just a hope. In history, the history that all 
humans know, more becomes revealed than was known at an earlier 
time. History brings us closer to Hilary Putnam’s “epistemologically 
ideal conditions.”
192
 In history we learn, for example, that chattel 
slavery was wrong, despite the assertions of some slave owners at the 
time of slavery—sometimes cynically, but sometimes in good faith—
to the contrary. The slaveholders were wrong. We are learning 
something similar in this time about the equality of women. And we 
may yet learn something along these lines about gay life. 
I believe it is possible to build a vibrant and diverse coalition 
around this commitment to the real—to the reality of the good, the true 
and the beautiful.
193
 By diverse, I mean specifically, believers and 
nonbelievers—religious practitioners and nonpractitioners.
194
  
But this coalition will have to be explicit about its commitments. 
Building a movement of renewal must include not only affirming the 
real, but challenging thoughtless and offhand comments about 
subjectivity and relativism. Much of the nihilism in this culture is 
unthought. It has become a default position. When I have noted the 
nihilism in law, for example, I have doubted whether the speakers 
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culture.” See Movsesian, Conversations: R.R. Reno, supra note 121. 
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would have affirmed their statements if they had been challenged.
195
 One of the democratic tasks of religious law schools is to 
provide just that challenge. One task is to confront a William Simon, 
for example, and charge him with complicity in the breakdown of 
moral life that he suggests he is merely accommodating. 
This coalition of the real will have to be equally open to religion 
and science. It will have to live with their apparent differences and will 
have to assume in faith that their deepest truths cannot be 
contradictory. 
Religious law schools are a good place to start reaching out to form 
this coalition. This is the first step in healing the breakdown of 
American Democracy. There is nothing here that requires religious law 
schools to break faith with their own, particular traditions. But it does 
require of them something quite new. 
Can this happen? On the secular side, I have already pointed out 
the difficulties—secularists mostly do not acknowledge the need for 
their own renewal and partnership with religion. But there is a problem 
also on the religious side. For this to happen, traditional religion would 
have to come to terms with the secularization of society—not 
sociologically, or even legally, but theologically. 
For the religious traditions in law schools, the rise of a secular 
culture presents a daunting question—has God abandoned America? 
How else to explain the rapid national shift away from religion? On 
one view, it must be our evil—our acceptance of abortion, gay 
marriage and war, perhaps. 
For the religious believer, though, there is another possibility. The 
other possible stance toward secularism is that somehow this event 
manifests God’s will. To quote Gamaliel in the Book of Acts, why 
oppose this new moment of secularism? If it is not from God, it will 
not last. If it is from God, then it should not be opposed.
196
  
It is not the case that everything traditional religion stands for has 
been abandoned in American culture. The young care deeply for each 
other. They have turned away from nationalism and militarism. Those 
are not exactly anti-Christian themes. 
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Even the widespread surmise that conservatives—here a substitute 
for traditional religion—have lost the culture war is overstated.
197
 
Specifically, it is the case that the culture has embraced gay marriage. 
But that is not true of all social issues. The culture has not embraced 
abortion, for example. Cultural discomfort with abortion has not 
collapsed; in fact it has grown, along with the widespread use of 
ultrasound imaging in pregnancy.
198
  
Is it not possible that the culture has better judgment here, better 
instincts, than does traditional religion? Perhaps abortion is really 
morally wrong and gay marriage is a more nuanced matter. 
More generally, the religious traditions teach that God sometimes 
does a new and unexpected thing. The younger brother might inherit 
the blessing, rather than the older.
199
 A shepherd might replace a 
king.
200
 It was certainly hard for First Century Judaism to accept as a 
Messiah a man who failed to oppose Roman rule and who failed to 
bring ascendancy to a Jewish Commonwealth. Yet, some Jews saw 
God’s hand in this new development. Could the growth of secular life 
in America today be akin to that moment? 
At least one Christian thinker has so affirmed—Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer. In the midst of the darkest manifestation of human 
secularism, in prison in the Nazi State, Bonhoeffer, in Letters and 
Papers from Prison, proclaimed man come of age.
201
 He suggested 
that God was teaching humanity to get along without Him. 
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Of course, I am pushing Bonhoeffer in a direction he would have 
resisted. The action of God to which he referred was a form of kenosis, 
the emptying of God, not the brassy, godless culture into which 
America is currently drifting. 
Nevertheless, this is a moment in which the religious/nonreligious 
boundaries could prove porous. The coalition of the real, to which I 
adverted above, would be hard to characterize in the old religion/not 
religion categories. It would contain both traditional believers and 
those who would have previously been called nonbelievers. That 
certainly would be a new and good thing. 
What should a religious believer do when the context changes and 
the old forms of religion no longer seem meaningful? In a rabbinic 
Midrash,
202
 the backstory of Abram, later renamed Abraham,
203
 is 
told prior to the divine command of Lech Lecha—the command to go 
to an unknown land that God would show him.
204
 In this Midrash, 
Abram is already a religious seeker as a young man. His family works 
in the religion business, so to speak—Abram’s father produces idols, 
which Abram, even before knowing God, would smash.
205
 So, Abram 
can be understood as oriented toward the old religious forms, but, 
finding them inadequate, looking for something else—something more 
real than an idol. That is when God says Leave, even though Abram 
does not know where he is going. 
The changing religious landscape in America feels that way to me. 
It felt necessary for me to leave the old form of religion even though it 
was not, and is not, clear what the new land will be. So this may be a 
time for the new—a time for Lech Lecha. 
CONCLUSION 
At the beginning of this article, Professor Simon observes that 
religious law schools are a place where rich religious and moral 
conversations can still take place. In this article I have given that 
assumption a very particular meaning, which is probably not the 
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meaning that Professor Simon intended. Obviously, in a religious law 
school composed solely, or even largely, of religious believers in a 
particular tradition, there could be a religious and moral conversation 
about American public life within the language and doctrines of that 
religious tradition. That conversation would indeed be richer than the 
denuded one that Professor Simon believes most Americans are stuck 
with by virtue of the collapse of secular, public morality. But that in-
house, religious law school conversation would be of little or no 
importance to the larger community, which is composed mostly of 
nonbelievers and of members of other religious communities. A 
situation along these lines is probably what Professor Simon had in 
mind when he contrasted Duquesne with a nonreligious law school. 
That view is too narrow. Religious law schools are not just places 
for fellow believers. Their concern is not just the welfare of one 
religious community, or even just the welfare of religious believers in 
general. By virtue of being American law schools, religious law 
schools have a responsibility to American public life. Given the 
breakdown of American Democracy, their task is to replenish the 
language of morality in such a way that the discussions at religious law 
schools about American public life break through into the 
consciousness of the greater community, thus transforming America. 
That is what I propose here as the role of religiously affiliated law 
schools in the renewal of American Democracy. It would not be an 
easy role to undertake, but, in the present darkness, it is a path toward 
light. 
But morality is only a step on that path. I had once thought that the 
way to heal American Democracy would be to introduce the question 
of being into law school study.
206
 But I now see that the question of 
being is too alien to those without grounding in continental 
philosophy. 
So, let me ask instead a comparable question: is it possible for the 
study of law to be a high and holy calling? I mean this the way I 
imagine the study of law used to be, when it was assumed as 
background principle that law could reveal the good, hidden order in 
reality and democracy would lead, at least inexactly and partially, 
toward Truth and Justice. My mentor Charles Black believed this. But, 
today, we can have the high and holy only as a question. 
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Given the current technological and other conditions in the culture, 
the actual answer to that question is plainly, no—law study cannot be 
high and holy. And the answer is no at religious law schools, also.
207
 
But, in order for the breakdown of American Democracy to be healed, 
it is necessary that the cultural conditions be altered so that the answer 
becomes, potentially, yes. Just consider how transformative the I Have 
A Dream speech and the Gettysburg Address have been. Those were 
moments of high and holy calling. 
Religious law schools are one place where the gap between what is 
currently possible and what is necessary could be acknowledged and 
addressed. That is, the question of the high and holy could at least be 
asked. That is the ultimate role of religious law schools in a new 
beginning for American Democracy. 
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